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THE SYMMETRY PRINCIPLE
BRADLEY A. AREHEART*
Abstract: Title VII provides symmetrical protection against discrimination in
that both blacks and whites, and men and women may avail themselves of the
law’s protections. In contrast, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act operates asymmetrically, shielding workers over the age of forty from discrimination
yet offering no reciprocal protection for younger workers. Why do some antidiscrimination laws protect symmetrically while others do not? More importantly,
why does this design choice matter? These are questions that scholars, courts,
and legislators have generally ignored. This Article proceeds in two parts. First, it
identifies symmetry as an important, yet frequently overlooked, way in which
American antidiscrimination laws differ. Second, it proposes the “symmetry
principle” as a major normative theory for analyzing and evaluating the design of
antidiscrimination laws. Symmetrical laws have unique expressive, tactical, and
substantive strengths. For example, symmetrical laws promote solidarity, are
more politically palatable, can more effectively challenge stereotypes, and are
capacious enough to respond to unanticipated forms of bias. This Article defends
symmetry as a default rule to be applied when addressing traits such as sex, age,
and genetic information. To comprehensively combat discrimination, however,
the law cannot rely exclusively on symmetry; rather, asymmetrical laws can under certain circumstances be uniquely beneficial. Sometimes a trait is not universally held and is most intelligible as an asymmetric measure, such as in the case
of disability. At other times, protecting symmetrically would mean giving advantaged groups a “reverse” cause of action that might further subordinate an already disadvantaged group, such as in the case of disability. Accordingly, this Article defends asymmetrical approaches to disability as well as several race-based
policies and doctrines. Taken together, the symmetry principle is capable of
imposing some degree of order on the wide-ranging policies and practices in
antidiscrimination doctrine. In addition to addressing this previously neglected
design choice, and considering how current laws might be modified to better pre© 2017, Bradley A. Areheart. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For helpful conversations and
astute insights regarding various drafts of this Article, I would like to especially thank Jessica Clarke,
Michael Higdon, and Jessica Roberts, all of whom were incredibly generous with their time. I would
also like to thank Richard Ford, Charlotte Garden, Jedidiah Kroncke, Scott Moss, Rachel Arnow
Richman, Jessica Roberts, David Simson, Sandra Sperino, David Wolitz, and workshop participants at
the University of Tennessee College of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, the University of
Kentucky Developing Ideas Conference, the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of
Law Schools, the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, and the 2016
Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law. I am grateful to Dacey
Cockrill, Alex Thomason, and Jimmy Snodgrass for excellent research assistance.
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vent and rectify subordination, the symmetry principle and its analytical framework may also assist future legislative bodies in crafting new antidiscrimination
measures that are directed toward formerly unprotected groups.

INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) determined that sexual orientation discrimination is, by its very nature, discrimination “because of sex.”1 Less than a year later, the EEOC filed two lawsuits
challenging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the private sector.2 These breakthroughs were the result of nearly three decades of evolution
in the interpretation of Title VII,3 beginning with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.4
The text of Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of “sex,”
and for the first couple of decades this was understood unambiguously as biological sex.5 Courts interpreted the statute to protect against the relatively simple act of preferring men over women—or vice versa.6 But Hopkins dramatically expanded the protection of simple sex discrimination to provide recourse
for the more complex phenomenon of sex-based stereotyping.7 This innovation
meant that masculine women and effeminate men now had a cause of action
not just for discrimination due to their sex, but also for discrimination due to

1

Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, Agency No. 2012-24738-FAA-03 (July 15, 2015).
See Press Release, Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits Challenging
Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/BJL8-NMHX] (stressing the “critical” importance of all U.S. courts recognizing the right of individuals to not be discriminated against in
workplaces because of their sexual orientation).
3
See generally KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW (2016) (discussing the evolution of U.S. sex discrimination jurisprudence during the twenty-first century).
4
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding Title VII allows women to
escape “an intolerable and impermissible catch 22” where possessing a trait, such as aggressiveness,
may be both essential to professional success and grounds for dismissal at the whim of a prejudiced
employer).
5
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145, 156 (1976) (holding discrimination based
on sex referred only to “traditional” practices that divided men and women along the axis of biological
sex); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissing claim by
transgender appellant on basis that “Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind” when
it passed Title VII).
6
See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding the plain
meaning of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination impliedly applies to both men and women);
Holloway, 556 F.2d at 663 (asserting that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination was meant to
ensure equality of men and women, unless there was a “bona fide relationship between” job qualifications and an employee’s sex).
7
See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250 (stating that where an employee’s gender would be cited as a
factor in an employer’s hiring choice, the Court would find “that gender played a motivating part” in
that employer’s decision).
2
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their gender.8 In other words, even if an employer did not generally discriminate against women, that employer could still be liable for sex discrimination if
it discriminated against women who did not fit certain gender norms.9 Additionally, since Hopkins was decided, nearly all federal courts have come to
recognize that transgender discrimination is also sex discrimination based on
sex stereotyping.10 Furthermore, gay and lesbian individuals have sometimes
found a safe harbor in Title VII’s protections for gender non-conformance.11
All of these developments further the antidiscrimination project by breaking
down sex-related stereotypes and barriers to opportunity.
These advances would not have been possible without a structural mechanism in the law, hidden in plain sight, which this Article identifies as the
“symmetry principle.” Had Title VII been crafted narrowly to protect only
women, it would never have reached some of the unanticipated and emerging
forms of bias outlined above. Instead, Congress drafted the statute broadly and
symmetrically to prohibit discrimination on the basis of “sex.” This equanimity
in protection for men and women has allowed Title VII the elasticity to protect
various permutations of gender and sex. Such symmetrical breadth has kept the
statute timely and relevant in grappling with emerging iterations of sex-based
animus.
This Article advances the symmetry principle as a new heuristic for understanding the design of antidiscrimination laws and, in turn, analyzing their
effectiveness. The symmetry principle mandates that once certain attributes or
characteristics are identified as worthy of antidiscrimination protection, all
groups within that universal ground must be protected. For example, Title VII
protects the universal trait of race, and it does so for all groups, including not

8

See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that Hopkins “applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too feminine”). See generally Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (arguing for
robust protection of “gender” under Title VII).
9
Though many people use “sex” and “gender” interchangeably, feminists have distinguished
between the terms since the late 1960s, when they appropriated the term “gender” to emphasize the
socially constructed nature of sex and counter the viewpoint that biology is destiny. Toril Moi, What
Is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory, in WHAT IS A WOMAN? AND OTHER
ESSAYS 3, 5 (2001); Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/ [https://perma.cc/
M8PW-EZ3E].
10
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317–18, 1318 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Barnes v.
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737, 738 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiff who did not conform to sex stereotypes had established prima facie sex discrimination claim).
11
Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 402–07 (2004). Often, however,
it can be impossible to separate out the bias due to sexual orientation versus gender-nonconformance.
Id. at 403–04. Moreover, gender non-conformance is often still not protected where it conflicts with
an employer-imposed dress, appearance, or grooming code. YURACKO, supra note 3, at 2–8.
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only blacks and Hispanics, but also whites—a traditionally favored group.12
Conversely, while discrimination laws protect those the law identifies as disabled, it does not protect those without legally cognizable disabilities.13 Such a
discrimination law is asymmetrical.
In addition to teasing out the key differences between symmetry and
asymmetry, this Article offers a theory about what those different categories
accomplish, and what they reflect about our national commitment to antidiscrimination. The symmetry principle is simple, yet unappreciated in the literature as a systematic explanation for how we fashion laws that prevent and provide recourse for subordination.14 The tenor of the “protectorate”15—or the
protected classes in aggregate—is symmetry.
Symmetrical discrimination laws have many strengths: expressively, in
promoting solidarity while retaining the moorings of antidiscrimination categories;16 tactically, in securing the political capital necessary for implementation as well as maintaining support through the use of a trait that all people

12
This is because, in most factual instances and applications, the law concludes that members of
different racial groups are all similarly situated. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2423 (1994) (noting “the law operates as a ban on formal inequality of the sort
that prohibits most explicit distinctions between men and women or blacks and whites”).
13
But see infra notes 66–75 and accompanying text (noting the circumstances under which people without disabilities are protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
14
Although one author has recently written on the topic of symmetry, the author does so only in
the context of four traits (race, sex, age, and disability) and principally through a different lens (labor
economics), and reaches a different conclusion altogether (symmetry is always warranted for discrimination laws). See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law,
2017 WISC. L. REV. 69. In contrast, this Article addresses a full range of traits (in both statutory and
constitutional law), applies a variety of lenses (including expressive, tactical, substantive, and philosophical), and concludes that both symmetrical and asymmetrical protections are warranted, depending upon the respective traits and circumstances. Several other scholars have invoked the terms
“symmetry” or “asymmetry” to make a more limited point. E.g., William R. Corbett, Babbling About
Employment Discrimination: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 686–92 (2010) (arguing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created some asymmetries between the proof structures for Title VII and the ADEA); Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical Way, 76 WASH U. L. Q. 105, 108 (1998) (outlining the contexts in which they advocate “asymmetrical legal doctrines”); Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1296 (1987) (proposing her own path to
sexual equality, which she identifies as “essentially asymmetrical”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating
Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168–70 (2011) (writing on “[t]he [p]roblem of
[s]ymmetry” in the equal protection context); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 558–68
(1998) (characterizing two approaches to equal protection as “symmetrical” and “asymmetrical” and
ultimately favoring the implicitly-asymmetrical “political powerlessness”).
15
“Protectorate” was a term coined by Owen Fiss and refers to the beneficiaries of discrimination
law those who discrimination law protects. Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has
Come: Anti-Discrimination Law in the Second Law After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 742, 748–52 (1974).
16
See infra notes 128–162 and accompanying text.
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share;17 and substantively, in robustly attacking discrimination while avoiding
the impossibly complex issue of forecasting which groups will require protection in the future—a virtue this article terms “adaptive breadth.”18
Symmetrical laws, however, also have weaknesses along all three of these
lines.19 In the wake of Donald Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency, especially, one might question whether symmetrical antidiscrimination norms are
just a way of reconsolidating power and enervating the sense that certain
groups are more subordinated than others. For example, some scholars have
critiqued racial symmetry under Equal Protection doctrine by arguing that
treating state actions that impact race equivalently simply preserves racial hierarchies.20 Further, some opponents of symmetrical laws have critiqued them
as providing only formal equality, on the theory that parceling out legal benefits according to egalitarian distributive principles may not result in just outcomes.21 They argue, in effect, that symmetry is fair in form, but not result.22
The symmetry principle may call to mind other ongoing scholarly dialogues and theories regarding why and how we protect against discrimination.
These theories include anticlassification,23 antisubordination,24 antibalkanization,25 and universalism.26 The symmetry principle is not coextensive with an17

See infra notes 163–223 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224–272 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 128–308 and accompanying text.
20
E.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1620–21 (2009) (categorizing Chief
Justice Roberts’s Parents Involved opinion that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” as a perfect example of his moral-equivalence stance).
21
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986).
22
See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 993–1001 (1993) (arguing against the
current symmetrical treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause and in favor of employing
heightened scrutiny only when a facially neutral practice disadvantages non-whites); Reva B. Siegel,
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119–220 (1996)
(arguing that facial neutrality of a race- or gender-specific law may mask the nature of the harm they
are inflicting).
23
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (noting the
distinction between anticlassification and antisubordination has dominated arguments for over two
decades).
24
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
157 (1976) (arguing the Equal Protection Clause proscribes laws or official practices that “aggravate
the subordinate position of [a specially disadvantaged group]”); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle:
On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 960 (1994) (explaining the principle of antisubordination maintains that specific groups of people should not be deemed “socially,
culturally, or materially” inferior to other groups).
25
See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1280–86 (2011) (articulating the principle of antibalkanization in the context of equal protection jurisprudence).
26
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2847 (2014) (“[U]niversalistic approaches to civil rights problems have had
18
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ticlassification27 or these other theories and, as illustrated in Part II, harnesses a
unique mix of their strengths. This makes the symmetry principle a critical,
though underappreciated, part of understanding equality in the antidiscrimination tradition.
Ultimately, this Article argues that discrimination law needs both symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to comprehensively combat discrimination. If symmetry is a default rule, this Article insists upon asymmetrical exceptions and attempts to delineate the principles under which asymmetry is
warranted. The case for symmetry is strongest where traits are universally
held, such as in the case of sex and age. At other times, the zero-sum impact of
protecting symmetrically is an affront to equality, justifying asymmetry. For
example, disparate impact jurisprudence and some race-based measures under
the Equal Protection Clause involve intrinsic zero-sum tradeoffs that may warrant asymmetric treatment. This Article thus defends asymmetrical approaches
for disability and certain race-based measures, including affirmative action.28 If
the Holy Grail for antidiscrimination theory is a “coherent normative foundation upon which discrimination law can securely rest,”29 the symmetry principle is one step further in the refinement of that goal.30
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I defines the symmetry principle
and argues that symmetry is a defining feature of discrimination law.31 Part II
many influential advocates in recent years”); e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341–55 (2012) (arguing in favor of “extra-discrimination remedies” that would protect everyone against discrimination);
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (1996)
(arguing for class-based affirmative action to address the legacy of discrimination); Kenji Yoshino,
The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2011) (defending a universalistic approach to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
27
Part I.C explains in detail the difference between symmetry and anticlassification (infra notes
94–121 and accompanying text), but one quick example illustrates the distinction. While disparate
impact is in clear contradiction with anticlassification principles (since it requires people to be classified into racial groups, with liability hinging on how the statuses of those groups compare), disparate
impact protects all groups, which makes the protection plainly symmetrical.
28
See infra notes 273–308 and accompanying text.
29
TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 6 (2015).
30
That a coherent normative foundation is the Holy Grail for antidiscrimination theory is evidenced by the scores of books and articles that have been written to unearth such a foundation. See
generally JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013); ROBERT POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001); ALEXANDER
SOMEK, ENGINEERING EQUALITY: AN ESSAY ON EUROPEAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011);
Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes and
Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 143 (2010); Sunstein, supra note 12 (proposing an “anticaste principle” as a foundational means
to interpret equality).
31
See infra notes 35–121 and accompanying text.
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examines and systematizes the strengths and weaknesses of symmetrical discrimination laws.32 Part III then explains how and under what circumstances an
asymmetrical protectorate may better achieve equality.33 Part IV briefly examines several laws, which are rightly or wrongly formulated and, in turn, considers what the symmetry principle may tell us about the future of the protectorate.34
I. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
A. A Working Definition of Symmetry
The tenor of discrimination law is symmetry, which is illuminated
through examination of the design of such measures. Generally, discrimination
law prohibits certain acts, or mandates other acts, when they are connected to
certain attributes or grounds.35 Beyond that, there is a structural design choice
when it comes to defining the protected class to encompass only one group or
protecting “all people along a certain axis of identity.”36 This puts groups and
grounds at the center of how best to define the protectorate.37
This Article defines a paradigmatically symmetrical approach to discrimination law as one where all groups within a universal ground are protected by
the law. Conversely, a purely asymmetrical approach is one where only some
groups within a universal ground are protected.
In a recent book, Professor Tarunabh Khaitan constructs a painstakingly
theoretical defense of discrimination law.38 While symmetry is not the focus of
his book, he briefly posits that discrimination law is “largely asymmetrical” in
that disadvantaged groups “benefit” or receive “greater protection” than relatively advantaged groups.39 Khaitan thus characterizes discrimination laws as
asymmetrical using an “as-applied” frame, or by focusing on the distributive
effects of such laws.40
This Article instead contends that the facial protection (or not) of certain
groups is a better way of thinking about symmetry in the antidiscrimination
32

See infra notes 122–272 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text.
34
See infra notes 310–349 and accompanying text.
35
KHAITAN, supra note 29, at 29.
36
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the
ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 464–65 (2006) (discussing the ADA’s rationale for protecting only those with
disability, in comparison to Title VII, which protects all those discriminated against on the basis of
sex or race).
37
KHAITAN, supra note 29, at 62.
38
See generally id. (fleshing out his theory of antidiscrimination law as based in groups and
grounds distinctions).
39
Id. at 61–62 (contending discrimination law is largely asymmetric).
40
Id. at 40 (positing that discrimination law’s benefits are asymmetrically distributed among
social groups).
33
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context, and for several reasons. First, under Khaitan’s theory, a law could
never really be symmetrical since certain groups will always make more use
than others of any particular discrimination law. Second, Khaitan’s categorization of certain laws would require an empirical judgment about who is making
the most use of certain protections; but his project is admittedly nonempirical.41 Moreover, determining whether certain groups make more use of
certain laws would always be fraught with peril since there are different ways
to think about deriving benefits from such laws. Would we measure the benefit
derived by how many lawsuits certain groups file, what percentage of those
cases get settled or won, or by analyzing the expressive benefits from such
laws? Under Khaitan’s formulation, there is no obvious bright-line means for
determining whether a law is symmetrical or asymmetrical.
Further, to the extent we are concerned about the benefit or distributive
effect of such laws, we should primarily be concerned with the perceived benefit or distributive effect.42 As Part III indicates, many benefits of symmetrical
laws do not depend upon how such laws actually get used.43 This is because
while the people who are responsible for acting on antidiscrimination mandates will likely be informed about the basic provisions of discrimination laws,
they are unlikely to have (or acquire) actual information about the probability
of a lawsuit or other costs.44 Accordingly, while it may be important (for expressive and tactical benefits) whether society in general, and employers in
particular, perceive that certain groups make disproportionate usage of certain
laws, “usage” or “benefiting” is a non-optimal basis for categorizing discrimination laws as symmetrical or asymmetrical.45
Khaitan’s aims are admittedly different, broader,46 and he is not focused
on analyzing symmetry in any systematic way. Still, thinking about the benefits and costs of symmetry establishes that facial—and not “as applied”—
symmetry is a better basis for establishing a new normative theory. The next
section will establish concretely that the symmetry principle is a defining feature of American antidiscrimination law.

41

Id. at 124 (stating his project is “theoretical rather than empirical”).
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 91.
43
See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text.
44
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 90–92.
45
Even perceived usage can be difficult to judge, due to availability heuristics and always changing demographics. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (explaining that the “availability heuristic” is misleading in that one’s
perceived frequency of an occurrence is based solely upon the ease of recalling similar occurrences).
46
For example, he is looking at the law from five common law jurisdictions. KHAITAN, supra
note 29, at 1–19.
42
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B. Identifying Symmetry and Asymmetry
Symmetry is a firmly rooted principle in discrimination laws.47 The most
prominent illustration of the symmetry principle is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII).48 Title VII protects people from employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, and national origin, and it generally does so for all groups within each of these universal grounds. Title VII’s
legislative history notes its intent to “cover white men and white women and
all Americans”49—an intent which has been demonstrated repeatedly in case
law. For example, Title VII has been interpreted to prohibit race discrimination
against majority group members,50 sex discrimination against men,51 color discrimination against those who are white,52 and national origin discrimination
against those born in America.53
Even the one protection of Title VII that appears to be limited—
religion—is nearly symmetrical in that it protects almost everyone from discrimination on that basis. The statute defines religion to include “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”54 But the EEOC defines
religious practices to “include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and
wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.”55 The result is that one is not required to be “religious” in any conventional way in order to be protected under Title VII. The law has been interpreted to protect white supremacists,56 atheists,57 and witches.58 Title VII’s protec47

Cf. Corbett, supra note 14, at 689–91 (arguing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created asymmetries in the proof structures for different discrimination laws).
48
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
49
110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
50
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286 (1976) (rejecting the argument that
white citizens are not protected by Title VII).
51
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (finding Title VII’s
protection against sex discrimination applies equally to men and women).
52
“Everyone is protected from race and color discrimination[:] Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos,
Arabs, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, Pacific Islanders, persons of more than
one race, and all other persons, whatever their race, color, or ethnicity.” Questions and Answers About
Race and Color Discrimination in Employment, EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 16,
2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_race_color.html [https://perma.cc/QB5T-P5L2].
53
See, e.g., Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1986)
(finding Title VII’s prohibition of national origin discrimination applies to all nations, including the
United States).
54
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
55
“Religious” Nature of a Practice or Belief, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2016).
56
Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (finding a
group promulgating white supremacy and denying the Holocaust constituted a protected “religion”).
57
Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that under Title VII “‘religion’ includes antipathy to religion.”).
58
See generally Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 134 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 1998) (treating
Wicca as protected under “religion”).
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tion of religion is thus, with few exceptions,59 symmetrical. In much the same
way, the Equal Pay Act60 protects both men and women,61 and Section 1981,
which forbids race discrimination in the making of contracts, protects people
of all races.62
The most recent statutory instantiation of the symmetry principle is the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).63 This statute makes it
illegal to discriminate against applicants, employees, and former employees on
the basis of genetic information.64 GINA covers all forms of genetic information, and because every individual has a genetic makeup, GINA effectively
covers everyone.65
Symmetry is such a strong norm that it sometimes appears unexpectedly.
For instance, it might seem intuitive that under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)66 only some people have legally-cognizable disabilities, making
the statute asymmetrical.67 To be entitled to rights under the ADA, one must
59

Generally speaking, “religion” does not protect those with a belief system that is purely personal, political, social, idiosyncratic, and/or too informal. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 256–58 (1988); see Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 777
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding postal worker’s strong opposition to war a religious belief); Wessling v.
Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (finding participation in preparing for a play in
a church hall was social and not religious); Brown v. Pena, 441F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(finding that eating cat food was not a religious practice because it was not a belief “based on a theory
of ‘man’s nature or his place in the Universe’”).
60
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012)).
61
Though the Equal Pay Act (EPA) was created to address the lesser bargaining power of female
employees, the language of the EPA applies equally to men and women. Basic Applicability of the
Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.1(c) (2017).
62
42 U.S.C. § 1981; McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286 (rejecting the argument that white citizens are
not protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
63
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
64
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1.
65
Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA.
L. REV. 955, 986 (2012).
66
American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
67
This Article treats the Americans with Disabilities Act as asymmetrical, even though the 2008
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) moved the statute closer to protecting all groups. Under the
Amendments, the statute now explicitly provides that a “regarded as” plaintiff need only prove an
employer made an adverse employment decision due to the plaintiff’s real or perceived impairment;
there is now no requirement, as there once was under the ADA, that the employer regard the impairment as sufficiently serious or stigmatizing. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or
she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major
life activity.”). This change to the “regarded as” prong means that almost anyone who believes they
have experienced discrimination can bring a discrimination claim under the ADA. See id. Professor
Michelle Travis has observed that we might now describe the “‘regarded as’ prong as a form of legal
protection for individuals without disabilities.” Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A
New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 998 (2012).
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generally be a person with a disability, have a record of a disability, or be regarded as having a disability.68 These protections facially apply to only certain
groups.
The ADA, however, (like most antidiscrimination statutes) contains
symmetrical protections for association,69 mistaken perception,70 and retaliation.71 These protections serve all groups. So under the ADA, individuals without disabilities are protected from discrimination due to a mistakenly perceived disability,72 because of their relationship with someone who is disabled,73 or for opposing conduct that violates the statute.74 The ADA also protects individuals without disabilities through provisions prohibiting or limiting
the use of medical examinations at certain times in the job application process.75
Even seemingly asymmetrical statutes may belie their core commitment
to symmetry. For example, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)76 amended Title VII to redefine the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” to
68

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
E.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892–93 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding discrimination because of an interracial marriage or interracial association was, in essence,
discrimination based on race).
70
E.g., Arsham v. Mayor of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 848 (D. Md. 2015) (holding employer’s
action based on employer’s perception that plaintiff was Indian or Native American, even though he
was not, served as proper basis for a Title VII claim); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283,
1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different
ethnic or racial minority than the plaintiff[’s] will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for
a hostile work environment” where an African-American employee was referred to as a Native American); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding a party may claim
national origin discrimination even if the discrimination does not accurately identify their true national
origin); Estate of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Section 1983 to allow a claim against a municipality for discrimination based on the mistaken
assumption that a plaintiff was Native American).
71
All antidiscrimination statutes include protections against retaliation for taking steps to enforce
the statutes. These protections typically include retaliation armor for opposing a practice one believes
to be unlawful, filing a charge, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. E.g., 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 12203 (Title VII and ADA, respectively).
72
See Travis, supra note 67, at 948–49 (discussing how courts required proof of an employers’
mistaken perception under the “regarded as” prong). But see Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 132–35 (2017) (chronicling how the ADA’s “regarded as” prong has
been ineffective).
73
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012) (defining discrimination to include “excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association”); e.g., Barker v.
Int’l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15–16 (D. Me. 1998) (holding that nondisabled employee set forth
an ADA retaliation claim by claiming he was fired for seeking accommodation for his disabled wife).
74
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting discrimination against anyone who opposes unlawful conduct—defined by the ADA—or participates in any ADA “investigation, proceeding, or hearing”).
75
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
76
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
69
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explicitly include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.77 Under
the PDA, an employer cannot use pregnancy as a reason to fire a worker, cut
pay, or deny health benefits. While only one group of workers (women) is protected under this amendment to Title VII, the PDA exists to ensure women are
covered equitably under “sex.”78 To the extent that the PDA is merely ensuring
complete coverage under a category (sex) that is symmetrical, the PDA is furthering symmetry.
Symmetry is also exemplified in the way the Supreme Court interprets
and applies the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. State action
is subject to differing levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate, or rational basis)
depending upon the ground, but the level of scrutiny does not change based on
the particular group implicated.79 For example, there is only one level of scrutiny for race. As a result, whether a law directly impacts Native Americans or
Whites or Blacks, courts scrutinize the action strictly—and they do so whether
the motivation for the state action is hostile, benign, or neither.80
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court reasoned
that attempting to apply different levels of judicial review to different races
was a nonstarter.81 In holding that all races must receive the same level of judicial scrutiny, the Court noted that there was no principled basis for deciding
which groups merited “heightened judicial solicitude.”82 In particular, the
Court said that trying to evaluate the extent of bias suffered by various groups
would be an exercise in sociological and political analysis, which falls outside
the realm of judicial competence.83 The Court asserted that its role is to discern
principles that are “sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the
community and continuity over significant periods of time.”84 In much the
same way, the breadth of the symmetry principle gives social and temporal
stability to antidiscrimination measures. For example, the universal scope of
the protectorate under a statute like GINA is not just responsive to the concerns
of particular places and times, but will have traction and continuity over a period of time—and even as there are advances in our knowledge of the human
77

Id.
See Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1203–04 (2016)
(citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as one example of Congress’s attempt to ensure equal opportunities for historically disfavored groups, such as women).
79
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to all race- or national originbased claims, regardless of which race or national origin is implicated).
80
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 397 98 (1989) (observing we
must approach state action with the same “presumptions, suspicions, and level of scrutiny,” regardless
of the group advantaged and independent of the reason for the law).
81
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294–96 (1978).
82
Id. at 296.
83
Id. at 297
84
Id. at 299 (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)).
78
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genome. Although some groups may have a greater need for antidiscrimination
protection than other groups, under a symmetrical approach, all groups are protected.
Asymmetry is sometimes still found in U.S. discrimination laws; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),85 which protects only those over
the age of forty, is the most paradigmatic case. Under the ADEA, there is an
asymmetry in coverage between those who are under, and over, the age of forty even though we all have an age. The design of the statute was intended to be
inclusive toward relatively older groups and exclusive toward relatively
younger groups.
The doctrine of affirmative action is also fundamentally asymmetrical.
Whether voluntarily adopted or court imposed, affirmative action plans are
directed only at groups that have been previously excluded by a company or
within an industry.86 The idea is that a company may take “affirmative action”
pursuant to a plan or program to remedy past exclusion. The steps may be designed as “race, color, sex or ethnic ‘conscious,’” and may include special recruitment programs or preference methods that give certain groups priority in
hiring.87 Still, affirmative action is—except in the context of government contractors88 or a court order89—a non-mandatory and thus less prominent feature
of the antidiscrimination landscape.
The symmetry principle does not rely on a rigid binary distinction between symmetry and asymmetry; I have defined the two, not all antidiscrimination measures will slot squarely into one category or the other. The starting
point for analyzing the remainder of antidiscrimination measures is the recognition that not all grounds are universally held. For example, only some people
have qualifying military service under the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),90 a legally-cognizable disability
under the ADA, or a medical or familial situation that would precipitate a right
to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).91 We might intuitively call such statutes asymmetrical, but they are not very exclusive; while
85

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
86
Establishing Affirmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(a)–(b) (2017).
87
Id. § 1608.4(c).
88
General Purpose and Contents of Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(c) (2017)
(requiring contractors to keep and “make available” records of affirmative action compliance).
89
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (noting that if a court finds an employer has intentionally discriminated, the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate”).
90
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8432b and 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333 (2012 &
Supp. 2017)).
91
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–2619, 2631–2636, 2651–1654 (2012)).
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not everyone has a right to nondiscrimination on the basis of leave taken or
military service, not everyone needs these rights.
In such cases, the exclusionary effect is muted since most non-universal
grounds may either be chosen or will be held eventually. For example, many
people have the capacity to choose military service or to adopt or foster a
child, and take leave from work. Were someone to make those choices, they
would be protected from discrimination under USERRA or FMLA, respectively. Alternatively, we will all be protected on the basis of age (under the ADEA)
if we live to the age of forty, and on the basis of disability (under the ADA), if
we live long enough.92 This dampens any exclusion under these regimes since
it means that very few are born into a world where they are necessarily excluded from the protective contour of these statutes. The parsing out of the definition of the symmetry principle, and its pervasiveness throughout the corpus of
discrimination law, indicates how antidiscrimination laws are fundamentally
inclusive—even in cases where they are not purely symmetrical.
At its base, the symmetry principle is a code of inclusion. Once a state or
federal legislature has settled on a trait or characteristic that should be off limits for certain types of distributional decisions (in domains such as housing,
employment, or education) the symmetry principle means that all are included,
and none are excluded, in the extension of that protection.93 Of course, in practice, some groups will partake more than others in certain types of protections.
But when it comes to the opportunistic structure of antidiscrimination law, the
symmetry principle means that all are protected under the law in the pursuit of
certain types of opportunities.
C. Symmetry as Unique Design Compromise
Symmetry may be seen as a design compromise between groupconsciousness and universalism in fashioning laws to prevent and rectify subordination. On one end of the spectrum are group-conscious or targeted approaches which are typically focused on challenging the oppression of historically oppressed groups.94 Group-conscious approaches embrace both grounds

92

Nearly everyone will eventually be disabled since the prevalence of impairments increase as
one ages. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 716
(2012). Consider that 13% of people ages twenty-one to sixty-four have a disability, but 53% of persons over age seventy-five have a disability. PAUL T. JAEGER, DISABILITY AND THE INTERNET: CONFRONTING A DIGITAL DIVIDE 18 (Ronald J. Berger ed., 2012).
93
While this may sound reminiscent of the anticlassification principle, symmetry is different as is
explained in Part I.C. See infra notes 94–121 and accompanying text.
94
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004). Cass Sunstein has similarly
argued against certain types of stereotyping by observing that “the most elementary antidiscrimination
principle singles out one kind of economically rational stereotyping and condemns it, on the theory
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and groups, but dispense with formal equality on the theory that disadvantaged
classes are not similarly situated to privileged classes.95 In practice, this may
mean that a particular group should be treated more favorably than a more
privileged class to remedy a lack of opportunities.96 Targeted approaches encourages policy-makers to address the structural effects of discrimination by
implementing certain asymmetrical practices, such as affirmative action or
reparations, which stand to effect the distribution of resources.97 Groupconscious approaches have the virtue of efficiently and transparently attempting to aid or shelter certain groups, who are often the people who need it most.
On the other end of the spectrum are universalist approaches, which ignore both groups and grounds, and instead guarantee certain rights or benefits
to “a broad group of people not defined according to the identity axes . . . highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws.”98 Over the last twenty years, numerous
esteemed scholars have advocated for universal workplace protections to address certain beleaguering issues of discrimination. For instance, scholars have
sought expansion of sexual harassment jurisprudence to cover all forms of harassment.99 Theorists have also proposed expanding leave policies to extend
beyond family responsibilities.100 Even more broadly, some scholars have arthat such stereotyping has the harmful long-term consequence of perpetuating group-based inequalities.” Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2418.
95
Areheart, supra note 65, at 963–64.
96
Id. at 964.
97
See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1398–99 (1991) (noting strategies such as affirmative action, reparations, and restrictions of hate speech all “recognize that ours is a non-neutral world
in which legal attention to past and present injustice requires rules that work against the flood of structural subordination”).
98
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2842.
99
See, e.g., Brady Coleman, Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States
Adopt European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53, 62–63 (2006); William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 96 (2003);
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace
Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 3–6 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 73, 75 (2001); Susan Harthill, The Need for a Revitalized Regulatory Scheme to Address
Workplace Bullying in the United States: Harnessing the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250, 1253 (2010); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American
Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251,
253 (2010).
100
See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace Flexibility:
The State of Play, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251, 270 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan Booth eds., 2009); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary
Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1108–12 (2010); Mary Anne Case,
How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of
Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1765–66 (2001); Katherine M.
Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 181–87
(2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 835 (2002); Vicki Schultz,
Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1882–86 (2000).
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gued that vulnerability is a universal part of the human experience and the state
should develop structures to address the disadvantage that accompanies vulnerability.101
Universalist solutions to discrimination have several advantages. They
may avoid political backlashes and help ensure broad judicial implementation.102 They may also help avert what Professor Kenji Yoshino has termed
“pluralism anxiety,” in which people are anxious about our increasing demographic diversity.103 Yoshino notes that speaking of rights in a “universal register” can help prevent our further breaking up into “fiefs” that do not communicate.104
Symmetry offers a compromise between antidiscrimination policies that
are narrowly tailored to a specific group (e.g., protecting only African Americans or women) and those that create generic rights (e.g., requiring termination
be for “just cause”). The benefits of this compromise will be explored further
in Part II, but it is worth preliminarily sketching them here.
On the one hand, the symmetry principle retains the moorings of identity
just like targeted approaches. This affirms the social salience of identity and
allows for some tailoring, which can, for tactical reasons, make such laws
more effective.105 Symmetry also avoids creating generic or universal rights
that either do not align well with the harms suffered by specific groups or require assimilation into existing forms of privilege.106 Symmetry, like groupconsciousness and unlike universalism, also facilitates the invocation of rights.
Such invocations are powerful: they raise people’s consciousness regarding
particular social issues,107 they change what employers feel they must provide
and what employees feel they deserve from employers,108 and they change how
corporate counsel advise clients to avoid liability.109
On the other hand, symmetry harnesses many of the benefits of universal
approaches. Symmetry is broad enough to foster a sense of solidarity, not back-

101

Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1, 19–22 (2008). See generally Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 (2008) (applying Fineman’s theory to
disability).
102
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2847–50.
103
Yoshino, supra note 26, at 751.
104
See id. at 747, 792–93.
105
See, e.g., infra notes 181–200 and accompanying text (referring to Part II.B.2, “Goodwill and
Dilution,” which details how more targeted antidiscrimination initiatives may avoid diluting the
goodwill available for such measures).
106
See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text.
107
Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 114 (2003).
108
Id. at 121.
109
Id.
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lash, when it comes to fighting certain types of bias.110 Symmetry, like universalism, emphasizes people’s commonalities rather than their differences.111
Symmetry also aids with matters of proof, where narrowly tailored measures
often result in a heavy dose of protected class gatekeeping.112 Further, symmetry avoids the negative distributive effects (namely hurting labor market
participation) that sometimes accrue to group-conscious approaches.113 Finally,
symmetrical protections allow a more complete challenge to stereotypes,
where more targeted protections may not.114
As noted in the Introduction, the symmetry principle is not coextensive
with existing theories, though it overlaps in times and places with anticlassification.115 Still, the vision of symmetry is altogether unique. Under the anticlassification principle, institutions ought to make decisions without regard to certain characteristics, much like when orchestras hold auditions with the musician separated by a screen to ensure the performance is only evaluated based
on musical merit.116 The anticlassification model is intended to “blind” our
ability, over time, to meaningfully distinguish certain traits by prohibiting the
very consideration of those traits—ideally resulting in a culture that is, for example, colorblind, sex-blind, or genome-blind.117
Symmetry has a different theoretical aim than anticlassification because it
does not aspire to blindness. For example, Title VII protects sex symmetrically
and robustly. The evolved vision of Title VII is not that we should ignore sex
and its gendered performativity, but instead that we should be suspicious of all
gendered practices. In other words, we should spotlight sex and gender in order to treat concomitant stereotypes with skepticism.118
110

See infra notes 163–180, 201–213 and accompanying text (referring to “Interest Convergence”
and “Backlash”).
111
See infra notes 133–140 and accompanying text (referring to “Commonality and Solidarity”).
112
See generally Clarke, supra note 72 (discussing how protected class gatekeeping undermines
the goals of antidiscrimination laws).
113
See infra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referring to “Distributive Effects”).
114
See infra notes 237–255 and accompanying text (referring to “Challenging Stereotypes”).
115
Various scholars have used antidiscrimination to mean anticlassification. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 30, at 1; Fiss, supra note 24, at 108. I, however, have used the word “antidiscrimination” as a
holistic term that refers to the general purposes underlying antidiscrimination law. See Jack M. Balkin
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58
U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“In hindsight, [Fiss’s] . . . choice of words was quite unfortunate,
because there is no particular reason to think that antidiscrimination law or the principle of antidiscrimination is primarily concerned with classification or differentiation as opposed to subordination
and the denial of equal citizenship. Both antisubordination and anticlassification might be understood
as possible ways of fleshing out the meaning of the antidiscrimination principle, and thus as candidates for the ‘true’ principle underlying antidiscrimination law.”).
116
Clarke, supra note 72, at 143 (citing Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000)).
117
Areheart, supra note 65, at 963.
118
I thank Jessica Clarke for raising this point.
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Symmetry also diverges doctrinally in that some antidiscrimination approaches require us to consider and classify on the basis of traits (an affront to
anticlassification), but the protections they extend apply to all groups (and are
thus symmetrical). For example, Title VII contains a cause of action for disparate impact, which provides recourse when a facially neutral standard or practice has a disproportionate impact on one group when it comes to hiring, firing,
or promotion. Disparate impact requires people to be classified into racial
groups, with liability hinging on how the statuses of those groups compare;
such classification is a clear affront to the anticlassification principle.119 Disparate impact, however, also protects all groups, making the protection plainly
symmetrical.120
Similarly, Title VII’s solution to the problem of religious discrimination is
not simply to force employers to ignore religious beliefs. Instead, the statute
goes beyond the anticlassification principle to require employers be religionconscious at times by accommodating religious practices. At the same time, because “religion” has been defined so broadly, encompassing atheists and white
supremacists and nearly everyone, the right to religious accommodations is in
harmony with the symmetry principle.121 Symmetry does not prescribe the form
of protection (and in particular, whether it “classifies” or not), making it a principle that wholly encompasses, and is more fulsome than, anticlassification.
II. THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY
This Part makes the case for symmetry as a customary feature of the antidiscrimination landscape. Symmetry combines many of the strengths of anti-

119

Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV.
493, 508 (2003) (“If the substance of an express racial classification is an express command that people be classified by race, then Title VII’s disparate impact provision surely qualifies.”).
120
E.g., Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011) (allowing white plaintiff to
challenge city residency requirement that had disparate impact on non-Hispanic white applicants);
Craig v. Ala. State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding disparate impact claim by
white applicant where historically black university staff was already mostly black due to hiring preference program); Ferrell v. Johnson, No. 4:09-CV-40, 2011 WL 1225907, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30,
2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that white plaintiff could not advance a disparate impact claim
under Title VII); Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031,
2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2008) (noting white male plaintiffs “convincingly argue[d]” disparate impact claim); Hannon v. Chater, 887 F. Supp. 1303, 1316–18 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(evaluating, and not dismissing out of hand, disparate impact claim by white male plaintiff); see also
e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 448–49 (1998) (observing disparate impact protects white male employees). But see Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252–53
(10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a claim that a maximum height restriction had a disparate impact on men
while observing men were not a “historically disfavored group”).
121
Supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
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classification, antisubordination, antibalkanization, and universalism.122 Professor Sam Bagenstos has recently outlined a model set of concerns (Expressive, Tactical, and Substantive) that might be analyzed in considering how best
to address discriminatory harms.123 This Part evaluates the arguments for and
against symmetry under the same headings. Expressive concerns are examined
through the messages a symmetrical law sends to the public. Tactical concerns
address symmetry’s role in currying political goodwill and avoiding political
backlash. Substantive concerns explore how the symmetrical design of the protectorate may be an effective policy tool for addressing injustice. Though addressed separately, there is no impermeable boundary between these categories
of analysis.124
The strengths and weaknesses outlined in this Part are theoretical.125 Any
particular policy must be analyzed in context to determine whether it will yield
certain advantages or disadvantages.126 Accordingly, it is impossible to conclude in the abstract that symmetrical protections are better than asymmetrical
ones, or vice versa. An asymmetrical policy may make more sense if the harms
are one-sided (as they often are in the case of disability or race), and the polity
is willing to accept the risks of essentialism.127 Accordingly, the strengths and
weaknesses outlined below are presumptive but may be rebutted by a contextual examination of specific initiatives.
A. Expressively
Symmetry has several expressive advantages. By expressive, I am referring to the fact that laws do more than secure material rights and deter certain
behaviors.128 Rather, they reflect social values and send messages to the public
about both what society should value and how the relevant subject should be
valued.129 Laws are constitutive of who we are,130 as well as pervasively ex122

For example, symmetry captures some of the advantages of universalism, such as avoiding
dangerous political dynamics and protecting a broad swath of citizens. But unlike universalist solutions, it avoids the dilution of rights through keeping grounds salient.
123
See generally Bagenstos, supra note 26 (evaluating the arguments for and against universalism
by examining Tactics, Substance, and Expressivism).
124
For example, an expressive dimension of symmetry may well influence a tactical dynamic,
which in turn helps or hurts the substantive effectiveness of the law.
125
Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86
IND. L.J. 1219, 1240 (2011) (making a similar observation about universalism).
126
Id.
127
See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text (referencing Part III which further explains
where asymmetrical protections are sensible).
128
See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND
LIMITS (2015) (discussing the law’s capacity to do more than punish, legitimize, or deter).
129
See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504–06 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change
Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 43 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837939

2017]

The Symmetry Principle

1105

pressive.131 While determining the expressive meaning of a particular measure
is unavoidably complex,132 it is worthwhile to consider the expressive potential
of antidiscrimination measures, especially since such expressions may impact
social norms and overall support for the law.
1. Commonality and Solidarity
One expressive benefit of symmetry in law is its emphasis on people’s
commonalities rather than their differences.133 Naturally, this can help build
solidarity on particular issues.134 For example, a contributing factor in building
support in the U.S. around the immorality of race discrimination in the 1960s
was the sense that all race discrimination—whether it was against blacks,
whites, or Hispanics—was wrong. Symmetry as a principle of antidiscrimination signals that we are not fundamentally different. Instead, we all have complex identities and certain features of those identities (such as race or sex or
genetic coding) are always protected from discrimination.
Here, we might consider Professor Reva Siegel’s work on antibalkanization, an approach under which legal interventions should be designed to promote solidarity and social cohesion.135 Even though antibalkanization may
sometimes support race-conscious asymmetry, Siegel argues such interventions
are only justified when they are formulated to affirm commonality and minimize the appearance of partiality.136 When protections are targeted toward one
specific group, they may send the message “that we should think of ourselves
as defined by our membership in particular, socially salient groups.”137
Another scholar has argued for broader protection from harassment.138
When the law focuses on sexual harassment as women’s problem it misses the
fact that “workplace harassment, sexualized or nonsexualized, injures the digSchool, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–72 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996) (exploring “the function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly”).
130
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109–13 (1984) (writing on
“[l]aw as [c]onstitutive of [c]onsciousness”).
131
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1504; Geisinger, supra note 129, at 40–41.
132
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1504 (acknowledging the complexity of determining
“expressive meaning”).
133
E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) (“To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery,
race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.”).
134
Advocates of universalist measures have made a similar argument in favor of such approaches.
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2864.
135
Siegel, supra note 25, at 1280–86.
136
Id. at 1302, 1354, 1358–59.
137
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2864.
138
Ehrenreich, supra note 99, at 4.
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nitary interests of individual harassment victims, regardless of their sex and
regardless of the sex of their harassers.”139 Therefore, harassing female employees is unethical not due to their sex, but their status as humans.140
The symmetry principle is a consistent signal that antidiscrimination protections advance the human cause—but without the drawbacks, which will be
explained below, of a universal frame. Symmetry affirms the dignitary interests
of all groups without the need to say whose rights are more important. Finally,
symmetry encourages people to think of themselves as part of a broad group
with a shared and noncompetitive interest in nondiscrimination.
2. Ground Salience and Rights Talk
A second expressive benefit of symmetry is that it retains the moorings of
antidiscrimination categories, such as disability, race, sex, and age. There is a
trend to dispense with such grounds and create “generic rights.”141 Scholars
have advanced universalist approaches to Equal Protection,142 voting,143 workplace accommodations,144 and employment discrimination.145 But grounds or
classes of identity serve important social functions, including “rights talk,” the
discourse that determines how society understands civil rights.146 Claiming
rights can inspire structural changes “in complex and iterative ways” beyond
the courtroom.147
There are at least two risks to identity-neutral, or “generic,” rights. First,
generic rights may not redress—or may actually worsen—the specific harms
139

Id.
Id.
141
Clarke, supra note 125, at 1220, 1245–46.
142
See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 748–49 (arguing for a shift from group-based equality claims
to universal liberty-based claims).
143
Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100,
119 (2013) (proposing “smart disclosure” regime that would apply to all voting changes); Richard H.
Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW.
L.J. 741, 743–44 (2006) (defending a universalist approach to voting rights).
144
Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis, Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 693 (2014) (arguing for an ADA-type reasonable accommodation mandate to apply to all work-capable members of the general population for whom
accommodation is necessary to enable their ability to work); see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 53–54 (2009); Arnow-Richman,
supra note 100, at 1108–12.
145
Eyer, supra note 26, at 1341 (arguing for “extra-discrimination remedies” to address discriminatory conduct in the workplace).
146
I borrow the term “rights talk” here from Mary Ann Glendon. See generally MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (stressing the
importance of “overcoming our disdain for politics,” accepting responsibility for social progress, and
embracing an inclusive approach to the ongoing discourse of civil rights in the United States).
147
Williams & Segal, supra note 107, at 121; see Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 401, 405–06 (1987) (defending the language of rights for people of color as empowering and useful).
140
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suffered by certain groups. For instance, a universal right to workplace leave
may be politically palatable and help normalize leave. It may actually widen
the gender gap, however, if men and women make different uses of such leave.
Some scholars have long observed that women often use workplace leave to
take care of family, while men often use the time to make themselves better
workers.148
Similarly, providing universal redress for harassment or bullying may not
accurately address the harms suffered by women. While women are often seen
as prototypical victims of sexual harassment, employers and courts may apply
different standards for men and women when it comes to what constitutes
“general” bullying. For example, social scientists and legal scholars have long
contended that aggression in the workplace is a virtue for men and a liability
for women.149 If aggression is normative for men, people may apply a lower
threshold when it comes to what constitutes bullying or harassment by women.
Accordingly, generic anti-bullying rules may not only fail to help women but
may instead cast them unexpectedly into the position of bully.150
Second, generic rights may undermine the goal of equality by requiring
assimilation into “the mold of the privileged group.”151 For example, under the
Texas Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees seniors in the top ten percent of their
high school classes admission to any public university in Texas,152 class rank is
a facially neutral standard. The underlying economic and cultural differences
that help shape one’s educational opportunities prior to high school, however,
are not neutral.153 In other words, the opportunity under a policy like this requires assimilation into the mold of what privileged groups are doing to help

148
Clarke, supra note 125, at 1275–77; Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing
the Way We Talk About Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 79,
89 (2009).
149
See JOYCE K. FLETCHER, DISAPPEARING ACTS: GENDER, POWER, AND RELATIONAL PRACTICE AT WORK 107–112 (2001); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 236–44 (1995); Alice H.
Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 18
(1992) (concluding women tend to be devalued in leadership capacities when those duties are carried
out in ways that are stereotypically masculine).
150
Professor Jessica Clarke notes there is already a tendency in the media to paint women as
prototypical workplace bullies. Clarke, supra note 125, at 1253–54.
151
Id. at 1246.
152
Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV.
245, 253–62 (1999).
153
While it might be tempting to view class rank as the natural outcome of inherent academic
talent, all behavioral outcomes are a delicate and multi-faceted composition. See FISHKIN, supra note
30, at 94–104. According to Fishkin, any physiological aptitude must be activated by a person’s environment, which encompasses everything from parents to one’s economic class to one’s interactions
with a social world not blind to difference. Id. at 94–95. So when we question how it is that someone
has achieved the status of, for example, “top ten percent,” the answer is that there has been “a multistaged, ‘iterative process of interaction between a person and her environment.’” Id. at 104.
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their children advance educationally. Even if the legal rule is blind to difference, the economy of opportunities is not.154
Symmetry offers a compromise between antidiscrimination policies that
are narrowly tailored to a specific group and those that would abandon the
moorings of identity by creating generic rights. On the one hand, the symmetry
principle makes grounds less prominent than group-conscious approaches, by
encompassing all groups. On the other hand, symmetry retains the protected
class moorings of identity, unlike universal approaches. Group-conscious approaches evoke Chief Justice Harry Blackmun’s view that “[i]n order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race . . . . [I]n order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently.”155 Universal approaches
summon to mind Chief Justice Roberts statement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”156 In this context, symmetry strikes a balance between making race too
salient and not salient enough. It calls neither for people to ignore race, nor for
differential treatment. Symmetry might thus be seen as a middle ground to approaching the social salience of grounds.
Symmetry also facilitates the discourse of rights, where universal approaches do not. If the goal of discrimination law is social change on behalf of
subordinated groups, we must not overlook opportunities to effect “norm cascades” through the language of rights.157 Universal approaches simply do not—
beyond the most general appeals—provide the same opportunities for rights talk.
3. Objections
One objection to the expressive strengths outlined above is that symmetry
may attenuate the message. Many times, we are not attempting to say that a
particular type of discrimination is wrong; rather, that a particular group has
been subordinated and that the law ought to do something about the subordination. For example, when the Supreme Court was asked in General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline to consider whether the ADEA covered younger
workers, or only those over forty, the Court did not spend any time assessing
the unitary wrongness of age discrimination.158 Age discrimination was wrong,

154

Clarke, supra note 125, at 1246.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
156
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality
opinion).
157
See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996)
(arguing social norms are “fragile” and that successful norm change can lead to “norm cascades,”
which involve rapid shifts in social mores).
158
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–96 (2004).
155
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according to the Court, when it had a tendency to subordinate workers.159 In
that light, the evidence clearly counseled in favor of protection for older—but
not younger—workers. Because there is sometimes a zero-sum relationship
between protecting younger and older workers, respectively, one might read
Cline as focused on the greater disadvantage faced by older workers. Extrapolating from Cline, one might view antisubordination as a trump card, which—
where there is a zero-sum relationship—may favor asymmetrical protections
designed to cover only specific groups who have suffered past discrimination.
One might counter, however, that group-specific signaling is near-sighted.
For instance, in the case of age, there is a growing literature that chronicles
how millennials are suffering from unwarranted stereotypes and frequently
experiencing discrimination.160 Commentators have recently uncovered discrimination against those under the age of forty in the technology sector161 and
television broadcasting.162 If the ADEA was crafted to cover age generally—
instead of only workers over the age of 40—the statute would have had greater
adaptive promise for addressing emerging forms of age bias.
B. Tactically
The tactical realm addresses symmetry’s role in currying political goodwill and avoiding social and judicial backlash. Tactical support is critical at
two different phases: passage and implementation. While a law must have
strong political support in order to be enacted, it must also avoid strong levels
of backlash for its message to be accepted and integrated into society. Given
that implementation of discrimination law depends on judges and voluntary
compliance by individuals, we must consider the matter of support across political, judicial, and social realms. This section first considers symmetry as a
form of interest convergence by design. Symmetry also plays a centrist role in
159

In Cline, Justice Souter stated that though the ADEA’s protection of only those over the age of
forty may initially seem “odd,” it is in fact based on reason. Id. at 605. “Congress could easily conclude” that younger workers are highly likely to find employment elsewhere after being dismissed for
“irrational age discrimination,” whereas older workers would likely encounter more difficulties recovering from such a dismissal. See id.
160
See, e.g., JESSICA KRIEGEL, UNFAIRLY LABELED: HOW YOUR WORKPLACE CAN BENEFIT
FROM DITCHING GENERATIONAL STEREOTYPES 54–60, 75–86, 99–102 (2016) (chronicling the discrimination faced by “millennials”); Ellen Powell, Study: Millennials Really Are Making Less Than
Their Parents Did, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/
2017/0113/Study-Millennials-really-are-making-less-than-their-parents-did [https://perma.cc/G9R4UMYS].
161
See generally DAN LYONS, DISRUPTED: MY MISADVENTURE IN THE START-UP BUBBLE
(2016) (writing about age discrimination at start-ups and noting that age discrimination affects even
younger employees within the technology sector).
162
E.g., Kirsten Acuna, Age Discrimination on TV: 10 Anchors Who Were Replaced by Younger
Women, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/age-discrimination-on-tv-10anchors-who-were-replaced-by-younger-women-2012-8 [https://perma.cc/DAY9-VAC5].
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managing the limited amount of goodwill that exists for antidiscrimination
causes and avoiding social backlash.
1. Interest Convergence
One starting point for understanding the political appeal of symmetry is
Derrick Bell’s well-known interest convergence theory. As Bell explained, in the
context of racial equality, the interests of a subordinated minority are likely to be
advanced only when they converge with the interests of a dominant majority.163
Securing legal remedies for minority groups may thus depend upon judges and
policymakers reaching the conclusion that such remedies “will secure, advance,
or at least not harm” majority group interests.164 Since first articulating interestconvergence in 1980, Bell’s theory has been wielded robustly to defend disability accommodations,165 explain the circumstances under which institutions pursue racial diversity,166 and defend the earned income tax credit.167
For example, the “diversity rationale,” which emerged from Grutter v.
Bollinger168 as the primary justification for affirmative action, has been generally accepted as a form of interest convergence.169 Professor Nancy Leong has
argued that this constitutes a type of “racial capitalism” in which whites derive
social and economic value from non-white racial identity.170 While Leong laments this phenomenon, it has admittedly aided in the implementation of affirmative action.171
We might think of symmetry as interest convergence by design. In particular, symmetry aligns the interests of majority and minority groups in the follow163
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History,
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) (arguing that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality is
accommodated only when that interest converges with the interests of whites in policy-making positions”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (explaining Brown required policy makers to recognize
“the economic and political advances” from desegregation) [hereinafter Bell, Comment].
164
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities
Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009) (quoting Bell, Comment, supra note 163, at 523).
165
See id. at 332 (arguing the ADA benefits the nondisabled workforce in effective and meaningful ways).
166
Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2171–72 (2013) (arguing diversity
has historically been sanctioned when whites decide they can derive social or economic value from
nonwhiteness).
167
See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 798–
99 (2007) (arguing tax policies that penalize low-income taxpayers will hurt white taxpayers more
than black taxpayers).
168
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–25 (2003).
169
See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003) (arguing
“Grutter and Gratz provide a definitive example of my Interest-Convergence theory”).
170
Leong, supra note 166, at 2153.
171
Id. at 2155.
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ing way: If all groups are protected under a relevant ground, then all groups (including the majority group) have a stake in both the passage and implementation
of that protection.172 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a prime example.173 Bell
observes that the elites of that generation recognized the legislation had widespread popular support,174 which—along with a combination of social, political,
and economic forces—helped ensure its passage.175 Some have similarly argued
that people may be more willing to support universal measures, such as welfare,
precisely because they avoid a zero-sum mentality.176
On the other hand, we might cynically wonder whether symmetry fosters
legitimacy by appeal to the dominant group.177 In other words, perhaps symmetry, in the tactical context, is just about appeasing those with power.178
While this objection has merit, antidiscrimination laws cannot succeed without
social buy-in and support. Even once such laws have passed, judges and institutions (composed of individual people making individual decisions) must implement them. Such support is necessary in order for society to accept the
wholesale changes that these laws often imply. Antidiscrimination law is thus
premised upon social norm change and voluntary compliance.179 This observation is true of all laws, but especially true for antidiscrimination laws, which
are notoriously difficult to sue under and win.180
2. Goodwill and Dilution
A second way of analyzing symmetry in the tactical realm is to consider
the need to manage the finite amount of support that exists for antidiscrimination causes. If such goodwill is limited, then the expansion of discrimination
laws risks “trivializing the more serious harms of discrimination and under172

See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 75, 116–17 (arguing that symmetrical antidiscrimination
statutes tend to be more widely endorsed than racial minority-specific statutes because those in advantaged majority groups realize they will benefit from symmetrical protection against discrimination).
173
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2005).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 1057–58 (citing Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 10 (1994)).
176
See THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 270–72 (1995).
177
KHAITAN, supra note 29, at 173.
178
E.g., Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 14, at 111 (asserting that symmetry appeals to advantaged groups because it “reinforces existing systems of privilege” benefitting those powerful groups).
179
See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to
Legal Authorities, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 984 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of “voluntary
compliance with the law” to legitimize “legal authorities” in a democracy).
180
E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557–58 (2001).
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mining support for antidiscrimination in general.”181 This has led some contemporary theorists to argue against the turn toward universal protections of
civil rights.182
Professor Richard Ford has written incisively on this subject.183 He notes
there are limits to how much support individuals will give to civil rights causes, with both economic and non-economic rationales. On the economic side,
Ford observes that many antidiscrimination measures impose real costs,
whether it is access for people with disabilities or limits on a business’s ability
to maintain uniform standards of grooming.184 There are also non-economic
limits to goodwill: “The good-natured humanitarian who listens attentively to
the first claim of social injustice will become an impatient curmudgeon after
multiple similar admonishments.”185 More practically, busy executives will sit
through only so many sensitivity training sessions.186 Ford concludes that “if
goodwill is exhausted and popular opinion sours, the coercive force of law will
be of little effect.”187
Professor Kenji Yoshino has similarly echoed the “limited goodwill” sentiment through his notion of “pluralism anxiety,” in which he argues people of all
stripes are anxious about the idea of ever-increasing and ever-more-complicated
diversity.188 He writes that in the past few decades there has been a proliferation
of groups clamoring for increased rights.189 As this has occurred, commentators
on both the left and right have expressed anxiety that we are fracturing into
groups too polarized to communicate well.190 Dilution of rights may thus occur
in legislatures, where representatives might be less willing to push for broad antidiscrimination laws, or in the judiciary where judges look for ways to cull their
caseloads.191 Yoshino finds pluralism anxiety and dilution present at the highest
181

Clarke, supra note 125, at 1247.
Id. at 1225 (arguing “those concerned about discrimination should approach the universal turn
with caution”); Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2852 (arguing “[c]ompassion fatigue may limit the utility
of a universalist response to civil rights problems”).
183
See generally RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS
MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE (2008) (discussing the difficulty of addressing racism in a purportedly “postracist” era where latent racism is still pervasive).
184
Id. at 175.
185
Id. at 176.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Yoshino, supra note 26, at 747–48.
189
Id. Yoshino observes, for example, that we are the most religiously diverse country in world
history and that the U.S. Census Bureau now acknowledges sixty-three possible racial identities. Id. at
747.
190
Id. Yoshino observes that even liberals decry the nation’s balkanization and are calling us
back to ideals of assimilation. Id. at 748 (citing, as examples, DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC
AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM (2000) and ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF
AMERICA (W.W. Norton & Co. rev. & enlarged ed. 1998) (1991)).
191
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2852.
182
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judicial level; he observes that the Supreme Court of the United States has, over
the past few decades, “systematically denied constitutional protection to new
groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited Congress’s capacity
to protect groups through civil rights legislation.”192
Professor Jessica Clarke further concretizes the goodwill and dilution arguments by examining proposals to expand sexual harassment law and leave
policy.193 She argues that universal workplace bullying laws may trivialize
sexual harassment by pooling those who experience sexual coercion with those
who would base a case on behavior that is merely adolescent and boorish.194
Clarke also addresses efforts to expand work-family policies to work-life policies. She argues that expanding leave may undermine employer support for such
policies.195 In particular, if any employee may request leave for any reason and
employers cannot inquire into the reasons for the leave sought, the easiest way
for employers to treat everyone equally may be to stop offering leave.196
To bring the role of symmetry into focus amidst these critiques of universalism, symmetry may be seen as a targeted means of maintaining goodwill
while still providing vigorous redress for discrimination. On one hand, the fact
that all groups are protected may facilitate more goodwill, than under an
asymmetric measure, through a sense that the law is fair and even-handed.197
On the other hand, symmetry stops well short of being a universal solution,
which may push common understandings of civil rights beyond most people’s
limits.198 Scholars have argued that universal measures may lead to a type of
compassion or equality fatigue and thus “be unable to overcome political and
judicial resistance to regulating business and state and local governments.”199
Universalist approaches are “complicated” and will not necessarily preserve
the goodwill needed for effective discrimination laws.200 Accordingly, symmetry may be understood as superior to both targeted approaches and universal
ones when it comes to maintaining a social appetite for discrimination laws.

192

Yoshino, supra note 26, at 748 (citing a series of cases substantiating these arguments).
See generally Clarke, supra note 125 (arguing that universal workplace protections will not
resolve the problems of workplace harassment or inequality).
194
Id. at 1263–66.
195
Id. at 1278–79.
196
Id. at 1279.
197
Corbett, supra note 14, at 691 (observing that symmetrical laws are more likely to be seen as
sensible and fair); see also Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 14, at 105 (arguing that symmetry is
viewed by many as quintessentially American, embodying the principle of blind justice).
198
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2853.
199
Id.; Yoshino, supra note 26, at 794.
200
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2854.
193
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3. Backlash
A third way of considering symmetry’s tactical role is through attention to
backlash. When antidiscrimination schemes treat people differently, they often
resist or label the differential treatment as “special treatment.”201 Discrimination laws that are targeted toward certain groups may be seen as “vexatious.”202
In this light, new rights claims may not merely be dilutive, but also engender
regressive conflict.203 Universal solutions have been thought to avoid backlash
on the theory that the measure will be less polarizing and stigmatizing to the
recipients.204
The potential for backlash is significant because such a response may impair enforcement. Professor Catherine Fisk has argued that if people have the
impression that certain discrimination laws aid only some people, it may fuel a
backlash that undermines all antidiscrimination law.205 Other scholars have
articulated the “fairness” objection in this way: Because the rule of law carries
“a special demand for evenhandedness,” a law that “‘knows the person’ is not
law at all, or at least not deserving of respect.”206 Furthering the point, studies
have shown that the ability to secure voluntary compliance with law is linked
to the attitudes of a population.207 Accordingly, we must care about backlash to
the extent it underlies a conviction that certain laws are not legitimate.208
Symmetry has some degree of a built-in defense against backlash and
claims about special treatment since a symmetrical discrimination law protects
all groups from discrimination on the basis of a particular trait. One benefit is
less stigmatization of weaker protected groups. In contrast, asymmetrical laws
may have stigmatic effects and actually increase discrimination. Consider the
pending Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which would secure an asymmetric,
pregnancy-specific right to workplace accommodations.209 I have argued such
a measure may revitalize exclusionary and paternalistic attitudes toward preg201

Id.
Corbett, supra note 14, at 691; cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
203
See Clarke, supra note 125, at 1243–44 (noting the consequential political effects associated
with the law showing favoritism).
204
Id. at 1224.
205
Fisk, supra note 99, at 93.
206
Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 14, at 109. Flagg and Goldwasser proceed to argue, persuasively, that this objection cannot stand. Id. at 109–10.
207
Tyler, supra note 179, at 985 (citing several studies for this point).
208
See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 125, at 1244–45 (arguing that once affirmative action was viewed
by some as fundamentally unfair, the policy could only be revived through reframing it as an ideal of
inclusion and diversity).
209
In June 2015, Congress reintroduced the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a federal bill that
would require employers to make reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. (2015).
202
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nant employees,210 signal an incapacity to work,211 and increase sex discrimination.212 In contrast, a symmetrical regime of parental accommodations (that
encompasses pregnancy) would protect both men and women in their roles as
parents and aid with both the expressive and tactical dimensions.213
4. Objections
One objection to the tactical strengths outlined above is that if a symmetrical law is understood or “coded” as serving particular groups, this may undercut the benefits associated with a broader frame. The social and political
understanding of a law simply may not track its universal form.214 Class-based
affirmative action may still be seen as a racial remedy215 and universally available work arrangements and leave policies may still be viewed as a solution for
female workers.216
Here, it is critical to consider carefully the type of protection and its social
context. Some targeted measures are so controversial that a universal or symmetrical replacement will still be less controversial—even if the universal or symmetrical protection is coded as serving the interests of a particular group.217 Further, we might consider whether a symmetrical policy is directly replacing more
targeted measures.218 If so, the tactical benefits may be muted.219 If not, the
measure is less likely to be interpreted as targeting only specific groups.220
Moreover, the benefits of symmetry obtain as long as an employer believes that
all groups make at least some use of the law.221 There are good reasons to believe
(a) that employers do not actually know if disadvantaged groups make more use
of certain laws than privileged groups,222 and (b) that employers overestimate the
proportion of claims brought by advantaged classes.223

210

Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1141–44, 1158–59

(2016).
211

Id. at 1160–61.
Id. at 1159–62.
213
Id. at 1170–71.
214
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2854.
215
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1913, 1939 (1996).
216
Clarke, supra note 125, at 1271.
217
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2855.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text.
222
Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
223
Infra note 266 and accompanying text.
212
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C. Substantively
The substantive realm addresses how the symmetrical design of the protectorate may promote justice. How might symmetrical approaches aid in the
pursuit of equality or otherwise augment efforts to redress discrimination?
1. Adaptive Breadth
One way of analyzing symmetry in the substantive realm is to consider
how symmetry’s breadth may give it more staying power than tailored
measures. While it is relatively easy to identify groups who have experienced
widespread discrimination, it may be difficult to predict exactly which groups
will need protection from discrimination in the future. In this way, symmetrical
laws are prophylactic and less likely to require future amendment for the scope
of the protected class. The symmetry principle may give discrimination laws
continuity over time since, as new groups face new versions of bigotry on the
same grounds, there is no need for a new statute.224
The best example, noted in the Introduction, is Title VII’s protection of
“sex.”225 While men were likely not seen as having much need for the statute
when it was passed in 1964, this breadth has had positive unintended consequences. In particular, the protection of simple sex discrimination has evolved
to provide recourse for sex-based stereotyping, gender non-conformance, and
sexual harassment. For example, in 1998, the Supreme Court held that samesex harassment fell within the protective ambit of Title VII.226 The Court wrote
that while “male-on-male sexual harassment was assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . . statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils.”227 Had Title VII only protected women, its protections would never
have reached a sub-class of men who have demonstrably needed protection
from discrimination.228
In contrast, asymmetrical statutes are more likely to require amendment
to ensure they are “broadly remedial.”229 For example, the pre-amendment
224

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296–99.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (finding Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition applies to men and women).
226
Id. at 82.
227
Id. at 79.
228
See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 724 (2010) (arguing effeminate men are common targets of harassment and discrimination).
229
U.S. antidiscrimination statutes are, as a norm, intended by Congress to be broadly remedial,
and have consistently been interpreted as such. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012) (Congress
intended that the ADA “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and provide broad coverage); Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (noting the “broad remedial intent of Congress embodied
225
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ADA, as interpreted, involved stark asymmetries between those who were disabled and those who were not.230 Over time, it became increasingly difficult to
prove that one was disabled, culminating in a state of affairs where over 95%
of ADA claimants in federal trial courts were losing.231 The result was that
eighteen years after it was first enacted, the statute had to be amended to dramatically broaden the protected class.232 Had the ADA been more broadly remedial from the start—perhaps approaching symmetry, as it presently
does233—the amendment might not have been necessary.
Even with the most paradigmatic of asymmetrical statutes, the ADEA,
prophylaxis might have favored a broader crafting when the statute was passed
in 1967. At the outset, we might ask whether the nature of the harms experienced by younger workers is qualitatively different than the discrimination
faced by older workers.234 If one reaches the conclusion that both involve the
same negative impulse—i.e., unguarded stereotyping on the basis of age—it
would have made prophylactic sense to eliminate all age discrimination at the
outset. As noted above, there is a growing literature that chronicles how
younger workers are suffering from stereotypes and discrimination.235 Had the
ADEA been crafted symmetrically from the beginning, it would now be positioned well to address new and unanticipated forms of age bias.
In sum, symmetry may give a law continuity and reach over time, and especially as new groups requiring protection emerge. As such, symmetry is a
in [the Fair Housing Act]”); Cormier v. City of Meriden, No. CIVA.3:03CV1819 (JBA), 2004 WL
2377079 at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) (observing Congress intended the ADA to be expansive in
reach and effect); Solorzano v. Shell Chemical Co., No. Civ.A.99-2831, 2000 WL 1145766 at *5
(E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2000) (observing both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
are expansive in reach and effect).
230
E.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (finding the ADA’s
terms must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled”).
231
See, e.g., Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Titles I and V—
Survey Update, 35 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394, 395 (2011) (reporting a 98.2 percent win rate for employers for cases that were resolved at the time of the survey); Amy L. Allbright,
2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 340 (2010) (reporting a 97.4 percent win rate for employers for cases that were
resolved at the time of the survey).
232
In the findings of the ADA Amendments Act, Congress rejected the high standard courts had
applied to the scope of “disability,” and admonished them to construe the ADA generously to provide
expansive coverage and application. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553.
233
See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
234
Here, it is no reply to say that there was no evidence in the legislative history of discrimination
against younger workers since (a) that is still not a reason to prohibit discrimination against workers
younger than forty; and (b) statutes may well be crafted with a prophylactic purpose in mind—the
most notable being the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV.
439, 441 (2010) (noting GINA is the first statute in U.S. history that preemptively targets discrimination).
235
Supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
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“sufficiently absolute” principle that can lift an antidiscrimination measure
“above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular place and
time.”236
2. Challenging Stereotypes
As Professor Naomi Schoenbaum has pointed out, where a ground contains two principle groups, symmetry may be critical to challenge the stereotypes associated with the more disadvantaged group.237 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the case of sex.238 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for instance, recognized early on the importance of challenging the gender norms imposed on
men in order to further the equality of women.239 In 1970, Ginsburg made the
strategic decision, on behalf of the ACLU, to challenge the constitutionality of
sex-based state action by bringing cases with male plaintiffs.240 Despite her
successes over the next decade in proving the Fourteenth Amendment reached
sex discrimination, legal feminists judged Ginsburg harshly for her reliance on
male plaintiffs.241 They argued she must be satisfied with formal equality and
failing to understand the limitations of a “sex-blind” doctrine.242 Yet it is illuminating to consider who Ginsburg’s plaintiffs were: one was a primary caregiver to an elderly mother; one, a stay-at-home father; several were men who
were married to women who were substantial breadwinners.243 Most of them,
simply put, “failed to satisfy masculine gender norms.”244 Professor Cary
Franklin argues that Ginsburg’s choice of plaintiffs reflects, among other
things, her understanding that the subordination of women was tied to masculine gender norms,245 and, thus, the equality of women requires “liberat[ing]
both sexes from prescriptive sex stereotyping.”246
Twenty five years later, Professor Mary Anne Case wrote about the role
of unconventional plaintiffs under Title VII in challenging the rigid gender
norms that constrain employment opportunities.247 She argued that effeminate
236

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (quoting COX, supra note 84, at 114).
See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 98–102.
238
See id. at 98.
239
See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 84, 162 (2010) (highlighting anti-abortion activists’ concern that allowing a
challenge to the constitutionality of abortion bans would provide Justice Ginsburg with a chance to
analyze abortion through an equal protection lens).
240
Id. at 84.
241
Id. at 85.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 87.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 104–05.
246
Id. at 104.
247
See Case, supra note 8, at 3 (arguing that feminists should advocate for antidiscrimination
protection for effeminate men as well).
237
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men must be able to challenge adverse treatment on the theory that as long as
men were required to take on masculine roles, one might reasonably suppose
that feminine traits would continue to be devalued.248 Case presciently argued
that the statutory language of Title VII was already capacious enough to protect
both effeminate men and masculine women in their departures from conventional gender roles.249 She relatedly pressed the importance of “sex-specific” instances of fashion and conduct, sexual harassment, work that supposedly requires mainly male or female characteristics, “single-sex education,” sexual
orientation, and transgenderism.250 All such cases held the potential to challenge the dominant and subversive norms associated with masculinity.
More can now be said about the theoretical value of symmetry for challenging stereotypes. First, symmetry appears to hold the most value when it
comes to challenging stereotypes associated with a ground that has a largely
binary structure.251 With such traits, it is easy to view one group as the opposite
of the other.252 So, for example, to be masculine means to not be feminine253
and to be young means to not embody the traits of those who are older.254 Second, the importance of symmetry for challenging stereotypes is of more limited utility when the ground is non-binary. Where there is a multiplicity of
groups under a particular trait, no one group is put necessarily into the position
of the foil for another group.255
3. Distributive Effects
Discrimination prevents people from navigating the opportunity structure
of life. So, one might naturally assume that prohibiting employment discrimination against certain groups will allow them to more ably traverse workrelated opportunities. In this way, antidiscrimination laws may have positive
distributive effects on workers by raising their employment levels and wages.256 In theory, this makes sense, but in practice “the actual distributive consequences of a mandate depends on whether it effectively constrains employers
248

Id. Professor Case opined that until men “feel free to engage in” certain behaviors, these behaviors will remain practically valueless in society. Id. Until “stereotypically feminine” conduct, such
as “wearing dresses and jewelry [or] speaking softly or in a high-pitched voice, [or] nurturing or raising children,” is seen as proper conduct for men, it will be relegated to “a female ghetto.” Id.
249
Id. at 4.
250
Id. at 5.
251
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 100–01.
252
Id.
253
See generally ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS (2016) (exploring hegemonic import of complying with masculinity
norms).
254
See generally JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION: AN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 48–67 (2006) (exploring hegemony of ageism).
255
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 101.
256
Id. at 86–87.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837939

1120

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 58:1085

from discriminating against the protected group in hiring or pay.”257 In advancing this argument on distributive effects, Professor Schoenbaum has pointed
out that “an asymmetrical mandate makes the protected group of workers more
expensive to employ, which can lead to reduced employment levels and wages
for these workers.”258
More to the point, there are stark informational barriers that prevent victims of discrimination from even detecting and bringing failure to hire claims.
Any contact between an applicant an employer is “typically fleeting, the eventual outcome is unknown to the candidate, and the process itself rarely signals
exclusionary intent.”259 So victims of hiring discrimination are unlikely to
know that they have been discriminated against or to have the information to
prove it. Even if they do bring suit, the numbers show that employment discrimination plaintiffs are wildly unsuccessful.260 Employers may thus be undeterred by the prospect of liability and choose to discriminate if they perceive
the costs of employing a protected individual to outweigh the marginal benefit
of hiring the best worker.
Asymmetrical discrimination laws have long been recognized as making
targeted groups more expensive to employ, which can in turn harm their employment prospects. The basic economic point is that if you raise the price of a
good or service, consumers will buy less.261 Nondiscrimination mandates can
raise the perceived cost of employing groups due to a fear of litigation, as can
accommodation mandates for which the employer must pay.262 The best example is under the ADA, where studies indicate that the employment of people
with disabilities has fallen since passage of the statute.263 The rationale for this
257

Id. at 88–89 (citing Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 254–61
(2000)).
258
Id. at 86 (citing Jolls, supra note 257, at 227).
259
Mark Bendick, Jr. et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 14 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993).
260
Studies have shown that employment discrimination plaintiffs have lower success rates than
plaintiffs in other domains when it comes to settlement, pretrial adjudication, and trial. Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131 (2009). The evidence from the appellate stage is even
worse. See id. at 112. A plaintiff’s prospects of remaining “victorious” on appeal are akin to relying
on the flip of a coin. Id.
261
Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23
REG. 21, 21 (2000).
262
See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 257, at 246–51.
263
See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 915 (2001) (noting a significant
drop in the employment rate of disabled workers since the passage of the ADA); Thomas DeLeire,
The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES
693, 698–702 (2000) (finding that employment rates of disabled men saw a significant decline after
the passage of the ADA).
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effect is straightforward. Many times, people’s disabilities are visible and other
times someone may be forced to disclose their disability during the hiring process (because, for example, they require a reasonable accommodation to be
“qualified” under the ADA). At this point, an employer may perceive such an
applicant to be more expensive to employ and choose not to be constrained by
the ADA’s mandates. The ADEA has had a similar impact. Initially, the
ADEA’s distributive effects were favorable, due to the immediate elimination
of overt age-based discrimination. But over time, the ADEA has been tied to a
reduction in the employment levels of older workers.264
Symmetrical laws are well-positioned to mitigate the potential negative
effects in the distribution of employment.265 This is because if all groups are
entitled to protection on the basis of a ground, the employer may perceive it to
be no costlier to employ disadvantaged groups than it is to employ relatively
advantaged groups. This point is strongest if an employer believes two or more
groups make similar use of a law. While one might intuit that no reasonable
employer would think that advantaged groups will use an employment discrimination law as frequently as disadvantaged groups, decisionmakers do not
have perfect information and lawsuits brought by majority or advantaged
groups often garner outsized attention.266
Moreover, the distributive benefits of symmetry hold even if the employer
believes that disadvantaged groups make more use of the law than others.267
By invoking the law, a member of the advantaged group increases the “cost of
employing members of that group,” which “clos[es] the gap between the cost
of employing the advantaged and disadvantaged groups,” and thus diminishes
“the disincentive to hire the disadvantaged group.”268 So even if an employer
believes that women are more likely to sue under a symmetrical regime than
men, as long as the employer believes men make any use of the law, any cost
differential between hiring men and women is less than it would be if the statute only protected women asymmetrically. Symmetry will almost always reduce the economic disincentive to hire members of the disadvantaged group.

264

E.g., Joanna N. Lahey, International Comparison of Age Discrimination Laws, 32 RES. ON
AGING 679, 684–86 (2010); Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. Gardner, Protecting Older Workers:
The Failure of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 38 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 9,
19–23 (2011).
265
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 86–91, 96–97.
266
Id. at 92–94 (observing that lawsuits brought by men and whites may be more culturally salient due to media reception).
267
Id. at 90–91.
268
Id. at 91.
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4. Objections
One substantive objection, which will be explored in much greater detail
below,269 is that symmetrical laws provide only formal equality. Opponents of
laws that are symmetrical sometimes argue such measures are fair in form, but
not result.270 That argument is most pronounced where there is a zero-sum relationship in protecting one group versus another.271 While symmetry may indeed
make it difficult or illegal under the law to treat groups differently, this is part of
the exchange in purchasing the benefits of symmetry. For example, Title VII
might have been formulated to only protect African Americans from disparate
treatment, but, arguably, the expressive, tactical, and substantive opportunity cost
might have been too great. Protecting all races symmetrically from discrimination has, among other benefits, supported rights talk, while encouraging solidarity; helped maintain a social appetite for Title VII, while avoiding dilution or balkanization; and ensured that other groups such as Hispanics and Native Americans are also protected from employment discrimination. Further, protecting all
races from disparate treatment has had critical distributive effects and allows a
more comprehensive challenge of racial stereotypes.272
While this Article takes the position that symmetry is useful in many situations as an antidiscrimination norm, it does not insist on symmetry for all policies. Any particular measure must be analyzed in its historical, legal, and political context. For example, race, sex, and disability are each very different in
terms of the expressive, tactical, and substantive challenges confronting them.
The preceding discussion provides a template for analyzing how the shape of the
protectorate might play a role in affecting the end goals of discrimination law.

269

See infra notes 273–308 and accompanying text.
Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
271
Infra notes 292–309 and accompanying text.
272
See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 101–02 (arguing, through examples, it is important to
challenge both “white” and “black” stereotypes in order to dismantle racial clichés).
270
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Figure 1.
The Case for Symmetry
Arguments for Symmetry
Expressive

Tactical

Substantive

Expresses commonality and
solidarity
Affirms the social salience of
certain grounds and facilitates
the invocation of rights
Interest convergence by design
Maintains social appetite for
antidiscrimination measures
Minimizes dilution of laws by
institutions, legislature, and
judiciary
Avoids backlash
Adaptive breadth ensures
future responsiveness to subordination and gives discrimination law continuity
Allows unique challenge to
stereotypes
Better distributive effects

Objections
Waters down a group-specific
message

May still become coded as
serving particular groups, undercutting tactical strengths

Fair in form, but targeted
forms would more robustly
address group-specific inequalities

III. THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRY
Not all discrimination laws warrant symmetry. Sometimes, antidiscrimination protections are most sensible as asymmetric measures. This Part will
describe when and how asymmetry makes sense as a complement to symmetry. The following closely-related rationales help explain why, under the
right circumstances, asymmetrical protections are most effective. Satisfying
any one of the conditions below is neither necessary nor sufficient to warrant
asymmetry. Further, although this Part breaks out separately the circumstances
which may support asymmetrical discrimination laws, the rationales overlap
and there is no strict boundary between these categories.
A. Where Traits Are Not Universal
The first and simplest explanation for why some laws should protect
asymmetrically is that sometimes the trait we are endeavoring to protect is not
salient for many or most people. Some asymmetrical protections, such as age,
could of course be reformulated to protect symmetrically. But in many instances, it simply does not make sense for the law to protect in a symmetrical way.
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In these situations, there simply is no sensible cognate group, corresponding to
the disadvantaged group, to protect.
For instance, if we place people who require medical leave under the
FMLA on one side of the centerline, should we also protect people who do not
require or take medical leave on the other? If we place people with disabilities
on one side of an imaginary axis, should we also protect people without disabilities? Even if we reimagine the categories as “disability status” or “leave
status,” it would not make intuitive sense for most people to talk of everyone
having such “traits.”
Similarly, if one views the protection of pregnancy as asymmetrical,273
one may see it as justified. In theory, the PDA could have protected men with
pregnant partners, but men with pregnant partners are not a socially salient
group. Moreover, men with pregnant partners were not advocating for protections when the PDA was passed because they were not facing adverse stereotyping or discrimination on that basis. In stark contrast, during the first half of
the twentieth century, state and local governments passed a myriad of laws
regulating the work of pregnant women. Such laws “‘protected’ women out of
good jobs”274 and led many employers to fire “women who became pregnant.”275 Accordingly, Congress chose to protect pregnant workers, but not the
spouses of pregnant workers.
Protecting pregnant employees through a right to workplace accommodations, however, might well be achieved symmetrically. Currently, pregnant
employees have no affirmative right to workplace accommodation under statutes like the ADA, PDA, or FMLA; this is why the media has been abuzz with
efforts to pass the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA).276 I have previously
argued in favor of creating a protecting scheme in lieu of the PWFA that would
accommodate both pregnancy and parental caregiving under the symmetrical
umbrella of “parental accommodations.”277 So whether one views the protec273
As explained above, the best view of the PDA is to see it as symmetrical, in that it merely
ensures complete coverage for men and women under “sex.” Supra notes 47–93 and accompanying
text.
274
Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and
the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 982 (2013).
275
Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 335 (1984–85).
276
Areheart, supra note 210, at 1133–41.
277
Under a pregnancy-inclusive parental accommodations model, the employee would need to
show that he or she (1) “has a pregnancy need or compelling parental obligation” that interferes with a
condition of employment, (2) notified his or her employer of the conflict “if possible,” and (3) was the
subject of a negative employment action “for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Once an employee establishes a prima facie case on these criteria, the employer must
show it (1) “made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s parental obligations,” or (2)
could not “reasonably accommodate” the parental obligation “without experiencing an undue hardship.” Id. at 1170–71.
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tion of pregnancy as asymmetrical or symmetrical (on the claim that the PDA
merely ensures equal coverage under “sex”), accommodation protections could
still be formulated symmetrically.
B. Where Groups Are Manifestly Dissimilarly Situated
Within the Opportunity Structure
Some laws protect individuals asymmetrically because some groups are
dissimilarly situated—and sometimes dramatically so. That similarly situated
persons should be treated the same is an archetypal proposition for thinking
about unlawful discrimination and the design of the protectorate. Discrimination laws thus aim to rectify situations where similarly situated persons are
treated differently. Nevertheless, the utility of this non-specific formulation
comes quickly to an end.278
To what extent are people of different races the same? To what extent are
women similarly situated to men? Professor Cass Sunstein has observed that
for race, the law concludes, in most instances, that blacks and whites and Hispanics are all similarly situated.279 For sex, the law urges that men and women
are similarly situated, except for a few circumstances involving past discrimination or reproductive differences.280 These types of identity may thus naturally invite symmetrical protections. At other times, people are very differently
situated. In such instances, the law may require that these people be treated
differently to achieve equality.281
Sometimes, the opportunity structure is so unequal that it counsels in favor of extending rights only to one group.282 For example, disability laws explicitly and implicitly recognize that a variety of barriers—including physical,
institutional, and attitudinal—in society prevent people with disabilities from
being similarly situated to those without, when it comes to the structure of opportunities.283 This means that people with disabilities must sometimes be
treated differently (e.g., provide special training or extend an accommodation)
in order to make them similarly situated for certain purposes, such as employment. This is why an employer may be required, under the ADA, to provide an
accommodation for a disabled person even if the accommodation is the only

278

See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (arguing
this proposition of equality is empty, in that it necessarily requires further value judgments).
279
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2422–23.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 2425.
282
See FISHKIN, supra note 30, at 20–22 (arguing antidiscrimination law should be fundamentally
about ameliorating severe bottlenecks in the structure of opportunity).
283
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012) (identifying barriers for people with disabilities in architecture, transportation, housing, public accommodations, and a host of other arenas).
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reason the person would be qualified for the job.284 The ADA inherently recognizes that the opportunity structure in society is unequal for people with disabilities and certain positive rights may be necessary to afford genuine equality
of opportunity.
Similarly, race-based affirmative action may be understood as a targeted
measure to assist in equalizing opportunities for minorities where there is a
“manifest imbalance” in certain industries or job categories.285 So while race is
generally treated symmetrically in discrimination laws, affirmative action is a
limited departure from that norm; it may not displace current workers or be a
permanent fixture on a firm’s hiring landscape.286 Affirmative action is thus
designed to open up the opportunity structure to groups who have historically
been excluded. Symmetry, however, is such a strong norm that whether affirmative action will remain politically viable is an open question.287
Finally, there may be no better example, of singling out one group for
protection in furtherance of equalizing opportunities, than the PDA’s protection
of pregnancy. In the first part of the twentieth century, about half of the states
had protective labor laws for female workers.288 There were general restrictions limiting the number of hours women could work, prohibiting night
work, and excluding them from hazardous occupations.289 There were also restrictions, prohibiting women from working for a period of time before and
after childbirth.290 Such laws created a “bottleneck” in the opportunity struc284

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual” as one who can perform the essential functions of a job either with or without an accommodation).
285
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979). See generally Establishing Affirmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(a)–(b) (2017) (discussing the requirements of a
“[r]easonable self analysis” and “[r]easonable basis” for affirmative action initiatives).
286
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (implicitly holding that affirmative action plans may not require the
discharge of some workers and replace them with others and that they must be a temporary measure).
287
Supreme Court decisions, as well as recent arguments that affirmative action will have a future
sunset, suggests a strong affinity for protecting race symmetrically. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 342–43 (2003) (stating affirmative action must eventually come to an end and suggesting twentyfive years after Grutter as that end point). The opinion in Grutter is consistent with other Court decisions that have also signaled the importance of ending race-consciousness. City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)
(plurality opinion); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Comment, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV.
185, 186 (2016) (stating that Supreme Court jurisprudence on affirmative action requires it to eventually come to an end). This affinity is reflected, for example, in Chief Justice Roberts’ statement that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion).
288
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No-85-494), 1986 WL 728369, at *12–13 [hereinafter ACLU
Brief].
289
Id.
290
Williams, supra note 275, at 334.
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ture for pregnant employees, and more generally, female workers.291 By redefining sex in 1978 to explicitly include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, the PDA gave women hope that they could pass through this
bottleneck to reach fulfilling opportunities in the employment sector.
C. Where the Zero-Sum Impact of Protecting Symmetrically
Subordinates an Already Disadvantaged Group
All opportunities, including those affiliated with employment, are finite.
This means that protecting one group from discrimination has the potential to
impair opportunities for other groups. Symmetrical discrimination laws thus
always contain the seeds of zero-sum tradeoffs. For example, the ADEA protects only those over the age of forty, and it only protects them in relation to
younger workers.292 But if the ADEA were formulated symmetrically to protect
younger workers, it would be illegal to ever prefer older workers. Accordingly,
a symmetrical ADEA might usurp opportunities from older workers. Still the
zero-sum dynamic is more accentuated with some discrimination laws than
others.
If the ADA were formulated symmetrically to protect people without disabilities, it would naturally impair opportunities for people with disabilities.
For example, the ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate people with disabilities, even though the accommodation sought may directly impact other employees. The statute lists “reassignment to a vacant position” as a
customary reasonable accommodation even though to do so will exclude other
able-bodied persons from that position.293 Similarly, a disabled person may be
entitled to “job restructuring” as a reasonable accommodation even if the restructuring means that other workers are required to perform tasks that are
eliminated for the disabled person.294 If the ADA were reformulated to protect
symmetrically, people without disabilities could argue correctly that they were
discriminated against by the provision of various reasonable accommodations,
including the reassignment or restructuring of tasks. Such a right for people
without disabilities would usurp the current rights of people with disabilities
under the statute.
There are also a variety of areas where protecting race symmetrically may
subordinate already disadvantaged groups. The symmetrical norms of the
291
See FISHKIN, supra note 30, at 13 (describing bottlenecks as narrow spaces in the opportunity
structure through which people must pass if they hope to reach a range of opportunities on the other
side).
292
See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 581, 584 (2004). (stating that an
employer is not prevented from “favoring an older employee over a younger one” by the ADEA and
related federal materials and statutes).
293
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
294
See id.
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Equal Protection Clause, for instance, may sometimes clash with race-based
(asymmetrical) affirmative action. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, a
white contractor challenged a federal program that set aside contracts for minority-owned construction companies.295 The contractor argued that choosing
the higher bid of the minority-owned company rather than his lower bid violated the Equal Protection Clause.296 The Court, in a five-to-four vote, held that
strict scrutiny was warranted and hinted the program was unconstitutional.297
The critical holding of Adarand was that all laws employing a racial classification must undergo strict scrutiny, with no exceptions for benign motives.298
The Court’s symmetry, in this context, conflicted with the anti-subordinationrelated factors, i.e., history of discrimination and political powerlessness.299
Professor Barbara Flagg has argued that when strict scrutiny is applied
evenly to all races, it is hard for the state to take even benevolent actions that
treat people differentially on the basis of race.300 In her view, there are strong
reasons to care about and prioritize particular groups that have suffered discrimination, are stigmatized, or face the future prospect of structural barriers.301 This may warrant abandoning the current symmetrical treatment of race
under the Equal Protection Clause and employing heightened scrutiny only
when a facially neutral practice disadvantages non-whites.302
Disparate impact jurisprudence is also an area of law that features a clear
zero-sum relationship in the distribution of opportunities. Assume that two applicants for a job (Ms. Black and Ms. White) are comparable in many respects
but must take an employer’s test, which factors largely in the hiring decision.
Assume further that Ms. Black does poorly relative to Ms. White and that Ms.
Black is able to show that the test has a disproportionate impact on other black
applicants, and is not required by business necessity. On these facts, the operation of disparate impact doctrine might mean eliminating the test and the reallocation of one position from a white applicant to a black applicant.303 In this
295

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–10 (1995).
Id. at 205–06.
297
Id. at 235–36; Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev.
1745, 1746 n.8 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court did not rule the program central to Adarand
unconstitutional, but did remand that issue to the lower court).
298
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that although the government
may be acting with the best of intentions, the Constitution does not allow for preferences based on
race).
299
Yoshino, supra note 14, 557–63.
300
Flagg, supra note 22, at 969–79.
301
Id. at 957.
302
Id. at 993–1001 (detailing her proposal); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New
Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191,
195–96 (1997) (contesting the Supreme Court’s arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
allow for positive law aimed at remedying racial injustice).
303
Primus, supra note 119, at 563–65 (giving a similar example).
296
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way, we might see the exercise of disparate impact rights as a reallocation of
opportunities to some groups at the expense of others.
Disparate impact is a unique way of redistributing opportunities because
it looks past facially neutral standards to dig deeper and structurally toward
substantive equality. While some commentators have argued that disparate impact is not available as a claim for whites,304 many courts have interpreted it to
give white plaintiffs a remedy.305 Given that we might think of the status quo
as an environment that already privileges advantaged groups,306 disparate impact might make sense as a doctrine that is only available to groups that have
historically been disadvantaged. Moreover, because Congress has clearly disavowed any requirement of proportional hiring,307 “it is hard to identify the social harm that occurs when a practice not intended to be discriminatory has a
statistically disparate impact on whites.”308
Making disparate impact asymmetrical might also help resolve the case of
Ricci v. DeStefano, in which racially attentive efforts were read to be the potential equivalent of reverse discrimination.309 If disparate impact were refashioned to only protect disadvantaged groups, it might cause the result associated
with not certifying test results or eliminating certain practices that have a disparate impact appear less discriminatory toward majority groups. In sum, in all
of these situations, one might view symmetry’s capacity to worsen the relative
subordination of a disadvantaged group as a reason to depart from the symmetry principle.
This Article has thus far endeavored to outline and provide a framework
for analyzing the stakes associated with protecting all groups, or only some.
The result is that any particular antidiscrimination policy must be examined
individually in order to draw a principled conclusion about whether the shape
of the protectorate should be symmetrical or asymmetrical.
304

See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1505–08 (2004) (arguing that the purposes of disparate impact
doctrine suggest that it is not available for whites, but that an asymmetrical approach would raise
constitutional concerns).
305
Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
306
Primus, supra note 119, at 524 (arguing that privilege is generational and thus “applying neutral criteria to haves and have-nots alike could help keep blacks an underclass in the workforce even if
employers held no bias in favor of maintaining that state of affairs.”).
307
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2012) (“Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of
existing number or percentage imbalance.”).
308
Primus, supra note 119, at 530.
309
Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585–86 (2009) (holding that, for Title VII purposes, an
“employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate impact liability” before it engages in “intentional discrimination for the . . . purpose of avoiding or remedying”
disparate impact discrimination).
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IV. THE SYMMETRY PRINCIPLE APPLIED
This Part will apply the insights from Parts II and III to sketch the argument that certain laws are rightly, or wrongly, formulated. This section is not
intended to be exhaustive or cover every discrimination law canvassed in this
Article. Several examples will suffice to illustrate symmetry’s import for current policy, including a few areas that warrant change.
A. Laws Warranting Symmetry
It may be most helpful to first return to a trait that is quintessentially suited for symmetrical protection: sex. Sex is universally held and performed
(gender), making it facially fitting for symmetrical treatment. The symmetrical
framing of sex has also positively aided in a variety of substantive outcomes.
These include its elasticity in protecting various permutations of gender and
sex,310 its ability to assist in challenging stereotypes,311 and its likelihood to
have more positive distributive effects.312 Moreover, protecting women asymmetrically has historically had regressive effects because to do so often typecasts women as physically weaker or implicitly connects their worth more with
home than with work.313 Such measures may then underscore stereotypes and
further increase the likelihood of future discrimination.314 Finally, sex is an
area where the concerns of goodwill, backlash, and interest convergence all
countenance in favor of symmetrical protections.
Age is also well suited for symmetry. While the ADEA only protects
those over the age of forty, this Article’s analytical framework supports refashioning the law to symmetrically protect all employees on the basis of age. Beginning with the conditions that may support asymmetry, age is a universal
trait and there is no fundamental dissimilarity between a worker who is thirtyfice and one who is forty-five. Further, giving younger workers a nondiscrimination right does not engender an unacceptable risk of further subordinating
older workers, in part because they are not all that subordinated to start. Far
from being a “discrete and insular” minority, older Americans generally are not
impoverished or afflicted by disabling social stigmas.315 Moreover, older
Americans have a disproportionate share of wealth and political power, leading

310

See supra notes 1–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–255 and accompanying text.
312
See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text.
313
ACLU Brief, supra note 288, at *17–19.
314
See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referencing “Distributive Effects”); see also
Areheart, supra note 210, at 1166 (arguing pregnancy-specific right to accommodation will increase
discrimination).
315
Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?:
The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 781 (1997).
311
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some economists to call the ADEA, and especially its elimination of mandatory retirement, a textbook case of “rent-seeking.”316
The benefits of symmetry also strongly support protecting age symmetrically. Broadening the ADEA to protect all employees on the basis of age would
give the statute permanent adaptive breadth, obviating the need to reconsider
the appropriate age threshold every time there are cultural changes, such as
increases in longevity or the emergence of industries that prefer older workers.317 As noted above, workers of all ages encounter stereotypes and millennials are no exception; certain industries, such as television broadcasting and
start-ups, are worse offenders than others.318 Protecting symmetrically would
also reduce any negative distributive effects on workers over the age of 40.319
Further, protecting symmetrically may be critical to challenge the stereotypes
associated with older workers. Much as in the case of sex,320 age is commonly
understood as a binary trait (old and young), with both groups facing corresponding stereotypes.321 Older workers may be seen as less flexible or more
resistant to change, while younger workers are viewed as too flexible and less
committed.322 A symmetrical law allows these stereotypes to be challenged
from both vantage points.
Genetic information also warrants symmetrical treatment and for many of
the same reasons profiled above. GINA signals our common humanity, while
equipping people with the language of rights, which can raise employers’ consciousness about the impropriety of using this information to distinguish between employees. GINA is different from other protected classes, in that it is
missing the history of discrimination that precipitated passage of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA.323 Its findings section, for example, cites only one specific example of genetic discrimination in the workplace324 and, instead, focuses on allaying fears related to “the potential for discrimination.”325 These facts
most explain the universal scope of GINA’s protectorate. Still, this symmetrical formulation is prophylactic and elastic, ensuring that GINA will have
traction and continuity over time. GINA is also unlikely to prompt backlash or
dilute goodwill, in part due to structural interest convergence and in part due to
316

Id. at 783, 820–30.
See supra notes 224–236 and accompanying text (referring to “Adaptive Breadth”).
318
See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (discussing objections to the “expressive
strengths” of symmetry).
319
See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referring to “Distributive Effects”).
320
See supra notes 236–254 and accompanying text (referring to “Challenging Stereotypes”).
321
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 100–01.
322
Id. at 100.
323
Areheart, supra note 65, at 985.
324
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
325
Id.
317
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the fact that no one expects litigation under it to overwhelm the judiciary any
time soon.326
B. Laws Warranting Asymmetry
Disability is a justified departure from the dominant norm of symmetry.
First, disability, perhaps more than other areas of identity, is least intelligible as
a symmetrical protection.327 At best, the ADA could be reformulated to protect
all mental or physical “traits,” but that would entail a full-scale acceptance of
protection from appearance discrimination—something society has not yet
proven willing to do.
Second, there is a manifest difference in the way people with disabilities
are situated from those without disabilities with respect to work. Even where
an employer has no discernible bias toward people with disabilities, the built
environment itself excludes.328 Indeed, when Congress passed the original
ADA it highlighted the “discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation,
and communication barriers.”329 Additionally, people with disabilities have
been heavily stigmatized for centuries and across different cultures.330
Throughout history, people with disabilities have been “shunted aside, hidden,
and ignored.”331 People with a wide variety of impairments have been segregated in a “collection of congregate institutions,” perpetuating the idea that
people with disabilities are incapable of participating in community life.332 And
even non-institutionalized disabled people rarely worked or patronized businesses.333 As noted above, we must sometimes treat people with disabilities
differently through the provision of reasonable accommodation to achieve
genuine equality of opportunity.
Third, protecting symmetrically would yield an enfeebled ADA since giving able-bodied persons a reverse cause of action would inevitably undercut
326

Cf. What You Should Know: Questions and Answers About the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and Employment, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/gina_nondiscrimination_act.cfm [https://perma.cc/X4D6-HSFM] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2017) (stating that since its enactment, 700 charges have been brought under GINA
with the EEOC resolving 600 of them).
327
Supra notes 274–277 and accompanying text.
328
Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.11 (2004)
(defining the “built environment” as physical edifices that are not wheelchair accessible and “the
rules, policies, and practices” that provide a social framework which does not account for all kinds of
physical needs and abilities).
329
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2012).
330
Areheart, supra note 210, at 1149–54.
331
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)
(statement of Rep. Vanik)).
332
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 441
(2000).
333
Areheart, supra note 210, at 1150.
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many of the accommodations the law stipulates as reasonable. As noted above,
the reassignment and job restructuring accommodations are both ones that require tradeoffs in the treatment of people with and without disabilities. If the
ADA were reformulated symmetrically, people without disabilities could win
the argument that they were discriminated against in the extension of such accommodations.
The ADA as currently constituted is already less exclusionary than it otherwise might be. As noted in Part I, the ADA protects people without disabilities from discrimination due to a mistakenly perceived disability, because of
their relationship with someone who is disabled, or for opposing conduct that
violates the statute.334 Moreover, the 2008 ADA Amendments Act vastly expanded the scope of the disability protectorate, leading some commentators to
discuss the statute as approaching universality.335
There is also a variety of race-based protections that warrant asymmetric
treatment. While race is a universally held trait, there are several doctrines
where protecting race symmetrically may subordinate already disadvantaged
groups. Scholars have for decades argued in favor of abandoning the current
symmetrical treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause and employing heightened scrutiny only when a state takes action that subordinates.336 In
one of the pioneering works on the subject, Professor Ruth Colker argues that
the value of antisubordination warrants abandoning the symmetrical treatment
under the Equal Protection Clause.337 Under her formulation, a state actor
could always use “facially differentiating policies to redress subordination.”338
In effect, she is proposing that state action be evaluated asymmetrically depending upon whether the impacted race or sex has a history of subordination.
She argues the antisubordination perspective is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause’s history and that understanding the doctrine through the lens of
antisubordination would provide state actors more flexibility to make use of
race or sex-specific remedies.339 Colker further argues this change in constitutional doctrine is necessary as a matter of substantive justice given the difficul-

334

Supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 263 (2010); Travis, supra
note 67, at 938, 998–1002.
336
E.g., Fiss, supra note 24, at 157 (arguing the Equal Protection Clause proscribes state conduct
that further subordinates an already “specially disadvantaged group”); Flagg, supra note 22, at 993–
1001 (detailing her proposal).
337
See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advocating adopting an antisubordination instead of antidifferentiation
approach in equal protection jurisprudence).
338
Id. at 1015.
339
Id. at 1013–14.
335

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837939

1134

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 58:1085

ty, demonstrated throughout history, in achieving true equality through raceand sex-neutral measures.340
Similarly, given the zero-sum distribution of opportunities via disparate
impact jurisprudence,341 it might be reasonably reformulated to protect only
those groups that have historically been disadvantaged.342 While less common,
it is not hard to imagine facially neutral policies that might aid minorities,
while disproportionately disadvantaging white workers. For example, reductions in force, which often disproportionately impact older workers could be
reframed as disadvantaging whites.343 Similarly, city policies in very urban
areas that restrict employment to residents might also disparately impact Caucasian workers.344 While symmetrically giving white workers a remedy in such
situations would remove any advantage non-white workers might have—in
effect, disadvantaging them—many of the benefits associated with symmetry
simply do not apply. There are no stereotypes, for instance, uniquely challenged through a “reverse” disparate impact cause of action, nor do the expressive and tactical concerns seem as weighty given that disparate impact applies
only to facially neutral standards and practices.
Finally, at certain times and in certain places and industries, there is a
manifest difference in the relationship different races have to employment. In
the run-up to Donald Trump’s recent election, racial inequities and divisions
have been pronounced and heightened. It is hard for many to recall a time
where racial injustice has been more on display than the present.345 There is
widespread police brutality toward African Americans, heightened and divisive
rhetoric directed toward Muslims and Mexicans, and ongoing school and housing segregation.346 Much more is known about implicit bias and the way in
which it can “predict racial disparities in employment.”347 It is clear we have
not reached a point where race no longer has an outsized effect in the distribution of opportunities.348 The project of building a more just opportunity struc340

Id. at 1013.
Supra note 303 and accompanying text.
342
See supra notes 303–308 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact jurisprudence as
a system of reallocating opportunities).
343
Sullivan, supra note 304, at 1509–11 (observing that the increase of women and minorities in
the workforce over the past four decades has resulted in an older workforce that is “disproportionately
white and male in many [areas]”).
344
Id. at 1509.
345
See Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 38, 38
(2016),
http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Forum_Vol.130_Boddie.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B942-6PE3].
346
See id. at 38–39 (chronicling “problems of racial injustice”).
347
See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom,
126 YALE L.J. 862, 876 (2017) (“[A] meta-analysis of 122 implicit bias studies found evidence that
implicit racial biases predict racial disparities in employment and healthcare.”).
348
See Cho, supra note 20, at 1593 (arguing “post-racialism” is a “dangerous ideology”).
341
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ture “requires a measure of intentionality that only affirmative action can deliver.”349 Accordingly, we might reasonably see asymmetry in the form of racebased affirmative action as warranted to help ameliorate the structural disadvantage that certain minorities have historically faced, and continue to face.
Figure 2.
Application to Select Statutes
Symmetry Warranted

Asymmetry Warranted

Law is Currently Symmetrical

Sex (Title VII)
Genetic Information (GINA)

Race (Equal Protection Clause)
Race (Disparate Impact under
Title VII)

Law is Currently Asymmetrical

Age (ADEA)

Disability (ADA)
Race-Based Affirmative Action

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the symmetry principle is one of the prevailing antidiscrimination norms. Symmetry has long been hidden in plain sight
and is distinct from other major normative theories. This Article has made the
case for a presumption in favor of protecting symmetrically in situations where
a ground is universally held. There will often be sufficient expressive, tactical,
and substantive benefits, associated with protecting all groups, to justify the
measure.
Despite these strengths, it is not always sensible or desirable to protect
symmetrically. This Article has identified a few situations where asymmetrical
laws may be more justified. Sometimes, the protection is most intelligible
when formulated asymmetrically due to lack of a cognate group or groups being differently situated within the relevant opportunity structure. At other
times, the zero-sum impact of protecting symmetrically would further subordinate in a way that warrants asymmetry.
We need both symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to comprehensively combat discrimination, because discrimination laws have different purposes and involve qualitatively different types of identity. This Article has
sought to install an analytical framework to guide legislative bodies in designing antidiscrimination protections in a rapidly evolving society.

349

Boddie, supra note 345, at 39.
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